Health Center Financial Check-Up: Prescriptions for Strengthening New York's Diagnostic and Treatment Centers by unknown
Health Center  
Financial Check-Up: 
Prescriptions for Strengthening  
New York’s Diagnostic  
and Treatment Centers
August 2010
Prepared by 
Primary Care Development Corporation
Health Center Financial Check-Up: Prescriptions for Strengthening New York’s Diagnostic and Treatment Centers
Summer 2010
E
nsuring access to high-quality, affordable primary care services is a central 
component of the New York State Health Foundation (NYSHealth)’s commitment 
to improve the health of all New Yorkers. The State’s health centers (formally 
Comprehensive Diagnostic and Treatment Centers, or DTCs) serve  
as the backbone of the primary care delivery system, particularly for vulnerable patients who 
are uninsured and have low incomes. These centers are affordable and provide high-quality 
care, but the sector as a whole is in financial distress. Particularly as the Federal health 
reform law is implemented, it is imperative that health centers have solid financial footing and 
resources to meet the growing demand for primary care services. 
This study and report, commissioned by NYSHealth and conducted by the Primary Care 
Development Corporation (PCDC), draws on robust quantitative data from the State Department 
of Health and qualitative insights from community health center leaders, providers, and 
advocates to paint a stark picture of the sector today. The report sheds light on the current 
financial picture for New York State’s DTCs, looks at the nuances of how Federally Qualified 
Health Centers (FQHCs) compare to other health centers, and outlines key recommendations 
for multiple actors who can shore up the sector. 
Since Massachusetts passed legislation that resulted in near-universal coverage, the state’s 
health care system has continued to struggle to provide universal access to timely primary 
care. With Federal health reform, we will see similar challenges in New York.
Provisions in the Federal health care reform law will present opportunities that can help  
New York develop a more robust and sustainable primary care system, but we in New York 
State must ensure that our primary care safety net providers are strong and well-positioned 
to meet growing health care needs. The opportunity to develop our primary care system 
exists; now is the time to take it. We believe that the following report and recommendations 
offer an important first step.
James R. Knickman 
President and CEO 
New York State Health Foundation
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Introduction and Background
D
uring the last several years, the New York State Health Foundation (NYSHealth) has 
received a growing numbers of requests for financial assistance from financially 
distressed health centers seeking to maintain primary care access in their 
communities. Simultaneously, the Primary Care Development Corporation (PCDC), 
in its role as the largest nonprofit financer of health centers in New York, also began seeing 
signs of financial distress among a growing number of the health centers with which it works.
To better understand the viability of the health center sector and the factors that underlie it, 
NYSHealth engaged PCDC to conduct an in-depth assessment of the financial viability of New York 
State’s nonprofit health centers. PCDC’s work and mission to expand and enhance primary and 
preventive health care in underserved communities position it well to undertake the assessment. 
PCDC conducted this study with the assistance of Health Management Associates (HMA). 
The assessment includes a first-of-its-kind quantitative analysis of financial and operating data 
from annual cost reports filed with the New York State Department of Health by nonprofit health 
centers (more precisely, comprehensive Diagnostic and Treatment Centers, or DTCs) between 
2001 and 2007, as well as interviews with health center leaders. The study specifically examines:
 The breadth and depth of financial distress among DTCs;
  Its causes and contributors, including external factors like size, health center type, payment 
policies, and internal factors such as governance and financial management; and
  Recommendations for the multiple actors positioned to address the challenges facing DTCs: 
the State of New York, which is responsible for the reimbursement and regulation of community 
health providers; philanthropic organizations concerned about the viability of health centers 
and access to high-quality care; public and private payers that finance or reimburse for care 
and services delivered at community health centers; and health centers themselves. 
Community health centers are a vital source of high-quality primary care for underserved 
communities in New York State. Residents of these communities tend to be low-income families 
who are either uninsured or enrolled in Medicaid and other public insurance programs.  
In 2007, there were 95 such comprehensive nonprofit health centers, according to the State 
Department of Health, operating more than 400 sites and providing more than 5 million visits to 
approximately 1.5 million patients. This set of Comprehensive DTCs is the universe of this study.
These health centers are located throughout the State—upstate and downstate, across urban, 
suburban, and rural communities. Most are located in areas that the Federal government has 
designated as medically underserved, where patients have access to few primary care resources. 
This study includes two types of Comprehensive DTCs: Federally Qualified Health Centers 
(FQHCs) and non-FQHCs. Approximately two-thirds of the DTCs in the study are FQHCs (the 
figure varies slightly in each of the study years based on data reporting and DTC start-ups and 
closures). FQHCs are required by Federal law to provide or arrange for a wide array of primary, 
preventive, and enabling services, including dental, behavioral health, substance abuse,  
and specialty care services. They must be governed by independent, user-dominated boards. 
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Introduction and Background (continued)
Finally, they must serve patients regardless of ability to pay. Non-FQHCs are not subject to 
these Federal requirements and the services they provide and the patient populations they 
serve may be more limited.
In addition to their status as either FQHCs or non-FQHCs, the DTCs in the study are divided 
between those that are “freestanding”—independently governed organizations—and those 
that are directly or indirectly controlled by a parent organization, often a hospital. FQHCs are 
typically, but not exclusively, freestanding organizations, while many non-FQHCs are hospital-
controlled. Only one FQHC of the approximately 40 in the study sample is hospital-controlled.  
In contrast, approximately 40% of the non-FQHCs are controlled by a parent hospital; some 
of the remaining non-FQHCs are part of a larger social service organization. It should be 
noted that there are other FQHCs in the State, including at least three that are either hospital-
controlled or closely associated with a hospital network, that are not included in the State’s 
“Comprehensive DTC” category and are thus excluded from this study.
In addition to the centers studied, limited DTCs, hospital-based outpatient centers, and 
private practitioners are also important sources of care for the same communities that rely 
on Comprehensive DTCs for care and services. Although not the focus of this study, they are 
subject to many of the same financial and policy factors as the Comprehensive DTCs. 
Hereafter, the terms “DTCs” and “health centers” are used as shorthand for the set of 
Comprehensive DTCs studied.
imPaCT oF FiNaNCial diSTreSS oN dTCS
Financial distress in the primary care sector occurs at a time filled with enormous opportunities 
and threats. It is a moment when policymakers at all levels are recognizing the critical role 
primary care plays in reducing health care costs, improving the quality of care, and preventing and 
managing the rising tide of chronic illness that now accounts for some 75% of health care spending.
For example, Federal stimulus funds through the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act awarded nearly $80 million to community health centers throughout New York State. 
Moreover, the State has reformed how it pays for primary care, established standards and 
incentive payments to boost quality, and provided millions of dollars to expand the primary care 
infrastructure and implement health information technology through the Healthcare Efficiency 
and Affordability Law for New Yorkers (HEAL NY).
Beginning this year, the new Federal health reform law will make available an additional $11 
billion in funding for community health centers nationwide and $1.5 billion for the National Health 
Service Corps over five years. As health reform is implemented and more people are seeking 
needed health care, DTCs’ role as a source of high-quality primary care will become even more 
important, both for those who remain uninsured and for those who are newly covered. 
Although DTCs are receiving an infusion of resources, these funds are largely for expansion and 
additional services and do not address their underlying financial condition. It is imperative that 
the sector be solidly situated to take advantage of these opportunities at a time when the  
State is asking more of the primary care sector and needs are growing.
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Introduction and Background (continued)
Finally, the distress occurs during a period of economic recession. Health centers face many  
of the same economic pressures as other small businesses, such as higher health care  
costs for employees and a lack of access to credit. They may face additional pressure as  
a growing number of uninsured patients turn to them as the only source of care. Unlike  
a standard company where business might fall off during a recession, for a health center,  
demand can remain constant or even rise, with more customers uninsured and unable to pay. 
a word abouT meThodoloGY
The study relies on four sources: 
1.  quantitative analysis of financial and operating data from annual cost reports (Ambulatory 
Health Care Facility forms, or AHCF-1s) filed with the New York State Department of  
Health (NYSDOH) between 2001 and 2007 by nonprofit comprehensive DTCs; 
2.  qualitative analysis of feedback received from the study’s Advisory Committee, which 
comprised DTC executive and financial leadership, consultants, and other sector experts; 
3. case studies and interviews conducted by HMA and PCDC staff; and 
4.  additional research on the sector (e.g., policy initiatives elsewhere in the country) 
conducted by PCDC. 
The methodology and data sources are described in detail in Appendix 3. 
HEAltH CEntERs AnD HEAltH CARE REFoRm: CHAllEngEs AnD oppoRtunItIEs
Federal health care reform presents new challenges and opportunities for health 
centers, particularly Federally Qualified health Centers (FQhCs). The new law expects 
that more than half of the newly insured—approximately 20 million new patients 
nationwide—will use FQhCs as their primary health care provider. although many of 
these new patients will be covered through the expansion of medicaid, FQhCs can also 
expect an influx of new patients with private insurance, because the law requires that 
all health plans offered through state insurance exchanges pay FQhCs no less than their 
medicaid prospective payment system (PPS) rate. 
The law also provides $11 billion over five years to help FQhCs double their capacity 
to serve new patients. most of the funds are expected to be used for expanded medical 
capacity and service expansions (including dental health, behavioral health, and 
pharmacy services), new access points (including new FQhCs and new sites for existing 
ones), and enabling services such as health education and case management. The funding 
is available to existing FQhCs and to new entities that want to convert to FQhC status. 
however, funding will be highly competitive across all 50 states, and health centers that 
exhibit the most viable plans will be in the strongest position to receive funding. Financial 
strength and organizational capacity varies widely among dTCs, and ensuring that New 
York can compete for and use this funding effectively should be a top priority.
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1.   the DtC sector, as a whole, is under financial stress. Based on DTCs’ annual financial reports to the New York State Department of Health, our analysis found that:
   43% of the 95 health centers lost money in all or most of the seven years 
in the study period.
   Health center margins have fallen dramatically, from 2.28% in 2001 
to 0.56% in 2007.
   With only 16.5 days of cash on hand—down from a high of 22 days 
in 2002—health centers were, on average, one payroll away from full-
scale financial crisis.
2.  there are clear predictors of which types of health centers are likely to be the strongest financially. 
  FQHC 
  Large size
  Strong leadership
  Strong financial and operational management systems
  Effective governance bodies
3.  External factors contribute to the overall distress of the sector. The financial strength of the sector as a whole reflects a variety of external factors, including inadequate  
and delayed payments and a difficult regulatory environment. 
Summary of Findings
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Three key indicators provide evidence of distress among health centers. 
Years of Financial loss.  Nearly three-quarters of health centers lost money in at least some years 
of the study, and 43% of health centers lost money in most or all years of the study. The ability of 
those with continuing losses to survive is typically determined by the willingness of a benefactor, 
such as a parent hospital, to subsidize the loss.
FIguRE 1. Comprehensive DtCs that lost money in multiple Years, 2001–2007
No years
27%
Some years
30%
all years
13%
most years
30%
Note: The source for all figures and tables in this study is hma’s analysis of data from ahCF-1 Cost reports, 2001-2007, conducted in 2009, based on 
the most recent data available. The data were provided by the NYSdoh.
Evidence of Distress
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Evidence of Distress (continued)
small median Financial margins.  Over the seven years in the study period, median health center 
margins dropped 75%, from 2.28% in 2001 to 0.56%, meaning that revenues were barely sufficient 
to cover expenses.
Declining levels of Cash on Hand. Days Cash on Hand measures the cash a business has to meet 
payroll and to make other necessary payments, should revenues be interrupted or delayed. 
Median Days Cash on Hand fell to just more than 16 days for New York State’s DTCs in 2007,  
an amount that would cover just more than one payroll period. Typically, 30 days cash is 
considered the minimum for a financially healthy organization; stronger organizations seek to 
maintain cash levels at 60 to 90 days. The ability to hold cash at these higher levels is well outside 
the experience of most New York State DTCs, and the levels at which New York’s DTCs operate 
means that they are always close to a potential financial crisis.
FIguRE 2. median margin for Comprehensive DtCs, 2001–2007
2.5
2.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
0.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
FIguRE 3. Days Cash on Hand for Comprehensive DtCs, 2001–2007
32
30
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
2001
DAYs
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
days cash on hand for 
health centers statewide
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Causes and Contributors to  
Health Center Financial Distress 
whY are Some healTh CeNTerS healThier ThaN oTherS?
A 
number of health centers in New York State are financially strong, despite the 
overall poor financial health of the sector. In addition, in the face of an overall 
downward trend in the financial performance of New York health centers over  
the past seven years, a number of centers have improved their performance,  
even to the point of turning their financial bottom lines from negative to positive. 
In interviews with seven executives from health centers that (a) have been consistently 
financially strong or (b) have turned their financial performance from negative to positive during 
the study period, in contrast to the overall trend, certain common strategies emerged. The 
Interview Guide is provided in Appendix 3. 
Each DTC executive acknowledged the difficulties of the environment, but each made it clear 
that they were able to overcome the standard obstacles by specifically and closely managing 
processes and factors that were creating losses or could generate more revenues. 
The common factors that emerged from the interviews and the financial performance analysis 
are discussed below. A host of factors are associated with better performance:
 Being an FQHC rather than a Non-FQHC  Improving billing and collections
 Being bigger is better (if you’re an FQHC)  Modernizing facilities

Being run by executives with detailed understanding 
of operations and financial management  
and clear lines of management responsibility
 Maintaining fiscal vigilance
 Raising unrestricted funding
 Improving provider productivity and  patient recruitment 
Developing and maintaining strong  
board governance
  beiNG aN FQhC raTher ThaN a  NoN-FQhC 
FQHC status confers a series of significant financial advantages, including: 
  a “wraparound” payment from the State ensuring that FQHCs receive cost-based 
reimbursement from Medicaid (thus restoring discounts taken by Medicaid  
managed care plans);
 Medicaid rates that rise each year in accordance with the Federal Medicare cost index; 
 malpractice coverage provided by the Federal government at no cost to the health center; and 
 access to Federal grants to offset the cost of medical care to uninsured patients. 
The benefits and requirements of FQHC designation are summarized in Appendix 4. 
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Causes and Contributors to Health Center Financial Distress (continued)
The decision to become an FQHC is key to financial strength, as the data confirm. In fact, FQHCs 
were financially healthier than their non-FQHC counterparts on essentially every indicator in 
every year studied (see tables and figures below). Each executive questioned in interviews for 
this study stated that the advantages of FQHC status more than offset the additional expense 
of meeting FQHC requirements (e.g., providing enabling services and access for any patient 
regardless of ability to pay). 
FQHCs had greater margins, more cash on hand, and stronger current ratios than non-FQHCs, 
and were less likely than non-FQHCs to incur losses. On the other hand, it is important  
to note that their strength is relative. On average, 22% of the FQHCs lost money in a given 
year during the study period, demonstrating a great deal of instability even among FQHCs. 
Nevertheless, that instability is far better than the 66% of non-FQHCs that lost money in  
any given year over that period, and particularly better than the 86% of hospital-controlled  
non-FQHCs that, on average, lost money in a given year over the seven-year period.
Moreover, the overall trends for FQHCs, as for the sector as a whole, generally went in  
the wrong direction over the study period: 
 median net margins fell by more than 50%; 
 the number of FQHCs with negative margins increased; 
 cash levels fell; and 
 receivable levels grew. 
Slightly offsetting this picture, current ratios improved somewhat. These key measures are 
defined and benchmarks are provided in Appendix 3. 
The single study measure for which non-FQHCs tended to outperform FQHCs was days  
in accounts receivable (AR), with non-FQHCs generally having fewer days in AR. The better 
performance of non-FQHCs may reflect more aggressive collection processes they have 
adopted for survival. 
Organizations that choose not to pursue FQHC status most commonly cite the requirement  
that a majority of the board be made up of patients, and the loss of control they believe would 
result, as the reason for remaining as non-FQHCs. On the other hand, leaders who pursued 
FQHC designation for its financial advantages also cited the advantages of a well-chosen board 
(such as additional expertise and deeper ties to the health center’s market and clientele) and 
saw no significant drawbacks to FQHC status. 
All of the financially strong health centers in the study are FQHCs. For centers with improved 
financial results during the study period, executives interviewed often identified attaining  
FQHC status as the central strategic element in achieving the financial turnaround.
Note: So-called FQhC “look-alikes” are considered FQhCs under law. as summarized in appendix 4, look-alikes receive some, but not all, FQhC 
benefits. Perhaps most important from a financial standpoint, look-alikes receive the wraparound payment. They do not receive 330 grant funding 
(Federal grants under Section 330 of the Public health Services act, which are intended to offset the costs of caring for the uninsured) or Federal 
malpractice coverage. This report does not differentiate look-alikes from those with full FQhC status.
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Causes and Contributors to Health Center Financial Distress (continued)
The weakest subcomponent of the sector is non-FQHCs that are freestanding or independent 
of hospitals. This category has neither the financial support of a big parent nor the revenue 
enhancements of FQHC status. It is essentially impossible to survive as a freestanding non-FQHC, 
and freestanding non-FQHCs tend to solve their financial problems by converting to FQHC status.
Statistically, hospital-controlled DTCs as a group are by far the weakest financially, with 
double-digit negative margins in all but one year. Their level of performance would be far 
beyond sustainability without the support of the parent hospital. Despite their losses, none of 
the hospital-controlled DTC organizations closed during the study period, although a number 
of the parent hospitals have come under increasing financial pressure and are actively 
looking for ways to reduce their DTC subsidies. Strategies under consideration include 
closing sites, converting to FQHC status, and negotiating a takeover by an existing FQHC. For 
a hospital, establishing an FQHC is difficult because of the governance and other extensive 
changes required in the relationship between the hospital and the DTC, and the uncertainty 
of Federal approval. 
The tables and figures below provide specific comparisons on a series of measures between 
FQHCs and non-FQHCs, including a breakdown between those non-FQHCs that are hospital-
controlled and those that are not. 
(Note: the 2007 data exclude those centers that filed their cost reports late. Not coincidentally, 
late filers tend to have weaker financial performance; therefore, the 2007 results likely 
overstate positive financial results.)
median net margin of FQHCs vs. non-FQHCs, 2001-2007
The median net margin for non-FQHCs plunged between 2001 and 2007, most notably for those 
that are hospital-controlled, and was negative in each of the last six years. The median net margin 
for FQHCs fell by more than two-thirds, but remained positive throughout the study period. 
tABlE 1. median net margin, FQHCs vs. non-FQHCs
mEDIAn nEt mARgIn
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007*
Non-FQHC - Hospital-Affiliated 4.61% -14.04% -16.52% -16.90% -22.77% -32.32% -24.32%
Non-FQHC - Non-Hospital-Affiliated 0.26% -2.22% -4.99% 0.50% -1.54% 3.67% -0.28%
Non-FQHC - Total 2.42% -7.89% -5.74% -4.00% -5.84% -0.68% -5.85%
FQHC 3.95% 3.65% 2.13% 2.89% 1.12% 1.82% 1.29%
total Comprehensive DtCs 2.28% 0.87% 0.78% 1.75% 0.11% 1.46% 0.56%
* 2007 data exclude centers that filed their cost reports late, which may lead to positive financial results being overstated.
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Causes and Contributors to Health Center Financial Distress (continued)
negative margins: FQHCs vs. non-FQHCs, 2001-2007
An average of 37% of DTCs lost money in any one year of the study period. For FQHCs, that 
figure was 22% (starting at 14% in 2001 and doubling to 28% in 2006). Virtually all hospital-
controlled DTCs lost money in virtually every year. For the non-FQHCs that are not hospital 
controlled, about half had negative margins in a given year. 
tABlE 2. negative margins, FQHCs vs. non-FQHCs
CEntERs wItH nEgAtIvE nEt mARgIns
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* ovERAll
Non-FQHC - Hospital-Affiliated: Total  9  9  9  9  10  10  7 
86%Number of centers with negative margins  8  8  7  8  10  8  5 
% of total in study 89% 89% 78% 89% 100% 80% 71%
Non-FQHC - Non-Hospital-Affiliated  11  11  13  14  14  13  14 
 
52%Number of centers with negative margins  4  7  11  6  8  4  7 
% of total in study 36% 64% 85% 43% 57% 31% 50%
Non-FQHC - Total  20  20  22  23  24  23  21 
66%Number of centers with negative margins  12  15  18  14  18  12  12 
% of total in study 60% 75% 82% 61% 75% 52% 57%
FQHC  37  38  41  41  42  43  38 
22%Number of centers with negative margins  5  6  9  10  11  12  8 
% of total in study 14% 16% 22% 24% 26% 28% 21%
total Comprehensive DtCs  57  58  63  64  66  66  59 
37%Number of centers with negative margins  17  21  27  24  29  24  20 
% of total in study 30% 36% 43% 38% 44% 36% 34%
Note: Centers that switched from Non-FQhC to FQhC are counted as Non-FQhCs during the relevant years and as FQhCs thereafter.
* 2007 data exclude centers that filed their cost reports late, which may lead to positive financial results being overstated.
Years of negative margins: FQHCs vs. non-FQHCs, 2001–2007
Two-thirds of FQHCs lost money in at least one year during the study period, whereas that was 
true of more than 90% of non-FQHCs.
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Causes and Contributors to Health Center Financial Distress (continued)
tABlE 3. Years of negative margins, FQHCs vs. non-FQHCs
 CEntERs wItH nEgAtIvE nEt mARgIns
 
DID not losE 
monEY In  
AnY YEAR
lost monEY  
In somE  
YEARs 1-3
lost monEY  
In most  
YEARs 4+
lost monEY  
In All  
YEARs
totAl
Non-FQHC—Hospital-Affiliated 0 0 5 6 11
Non-FQHC—Non-Hospital-Affiliated 2 4 7 3 16
Non-FQHC—Number by  
Net Margin Category 2 4 12 9 27
Non-FQHC—Percent of Total Non-FQHCs  
in Each Net Margin Category 7% 15% 44% 33% 100%
FQHC—Number by Net Margin Category 16 17 12 1 46
FQHC—Percent of Total FQHCs in Each  
Net Margin Category 35% 37% 26% 2% 100%
total Comprehensive DtCs 
Number by Net Margin Category 18 21 24 10 73
Percent of Total Comprehensive DTCs in 
Each Net Margin Category 25% 29% 33% 14% 100%
Note: accounts for each center only once; those centers that switched from Non-FQhC to FQhC are counted in the FQhC category oNlY.
Current Ratio: FQHC vs. non-FQHCs, 2001-2007
Current ratio measures assets convertible to cash within a one-year period (“current assets”) 
compared to bills that must be paid within that same time period (“current liabilities”). Current 
ratios for both FQHCs and non-FQHCs improved somewhat over the study period, as shown 
in Figure 4 and Table 4. The reason is unclear, given the generally negative trends in other 
financial factors. A current ratio of 1.0 means that the two are equal and connotes just getting 
by. A current ratio of 1.0 is considered the bare minimum acceptable level, with levels of 1.25 or 
higher preferred. The sector as a whole stood at 1.74 in 2007, up from 1.34 in 2001.
FIguRE 4. median Current Ratio: FQHCs vs. non-FQHCs, 2001–2007
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tABlE 4. median Current Ratio, FQHCs vs. non-FQHCs
 mEDIAn CuRREnt RAtIo
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Non-FQHC - Hospital-Affiliated  0.81  2.24  1.34  0.73  0.68  0.47  0.92 
Non-FQHC - Non-Hospital-Affiliated  1.09  0.93  0.87  1.09  1.03  1.16  2.35 
Non-FQHC - Total  1.07  1.01  0.98  0.85  0.86  1.11  1.72 
FQHC  1.43  1.45  1.68  1.85  1.67  1.79  1.77 
total Comprehensive DtCs  1.34  1.43  1.58  1.43  1.45  1.64  1.74 
median number of Days Cash on Hand: FQHC vs. non-FQHCs, 2001-2007
Median days cash on hand for FQHCs and non-FQHCs alike fell between 2001 and 2007, and 
for both groups remained below the generally accepted 30-day measure of financial health, as 
shown in Figure 5 and Table 5. Non-FQHCs showed greater volatility on this measure than did 
FQHCs and, at best, had half the median cash level of the FQHCs.
FIguRE 5. median number of Days Cash on Hand: 
FQHCs vs. non-FQHCs, 2001–2007
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tABlE 5. median Days Cash on Hand, FQHCs vs. non-FQHCs
mEDIAn DAYs CAsH on HAnD
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Non-FQHC - Hospital-Affiliated  13.93  10.82  12.12  1.89  9.17  16.14  7.23 
Non-FQHC - Non-Hospital-Affiliated  9.26  9.65  2.07  4.44  2.63  4.88  5.55 
Non-FQHC - Total  11.92  10.82  6.62  3.03  4.21  9.20  6.37 
FQHC  22.79  27.10  23.46  27.31  22.11  20.28  21.48 
total Comprehensive DtCs  19.86  22.39  19.76  20.69  18.23  16.18  16.49 
median number of Days in Accounts Receivable: FQHCs vs. non-FQHCs, 2001-2007
Days in receivables, which measures the ability of a business to collect on payments due to it, 
have generally risen over the study period. There are two likely explanations: 
First, State payments for Medicaid rate adjustments and add-ons, as well as grant revenues, 
are often delayed, sometimes by as much as two or three years. For example, centers serving 
a high percentage of uninsured patients earn indigent care revenues all year long, but receive 
payment two to three years later in one or two lump sums (see below). Similarly, organizations 
can earn revenue from rate adjustments months in advance of final approval and payment by 
the State. (In a recent positive development, the New York State Department of Health in 2010 
began monthly payments for indigent care.)
Second, as the Medicaid program has increasingly switched to managed care, health centers 
experience greater difficulty in collecting from multiple companies using differing forms and 
procedures, compared with billing and collecting from a single source (see also below).
Better-performing centers have fewer days in AR and higher levels of cash on hand. In 
all years except 2007, the median number of days in AR was lower for non-FQHCs than 
for FQHCs, which may reflect more aggressive collections necessary to ensure non-
FQHCs’ survival, as noted earlier. Combined with their low level of days cash on hand, 
these indicators show how close to the bone non-FQHCs operated, with little margin for 
error. Among FQHCs, which showed higher median days cash, high days in AR may reflect 
an opportunity to improve collections and/or the need for the State to reduce delays in 
payments owed to health centers. 
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  beiNG biGGer iS beTTer (iF You’re aN FQhC)
Size and financial success are correlated for FQHCs, but apparently not for non-FQHCs, as shown 
in Table 6. Correlation among non-FQHCs may be masked by support from an outside organization 
(e.g., an affiliated hospital or social service agency) which is more common among non-FQHCs. 
Large FQHCs (those with more than 100,000 visits) consistently performed better than their 
medium-sized counterparts (those with 15,000 to 100,000 visits) in cash on hand, margins, and 
current ratio. The analysis does not explain whether a center is financially successful because it is 
large or whether it is able to grow large because it is financially successful.
The number of health centers qualifying as “small” (fewer than 15,000 visits) was not large 
enough to draw a conclusion, and so have been excluded from this discussion. Table 6 shows the 
median performance on key financial indicators for large and medium-size FQHCs over the five-
year period between 2003 and 2007 (2001 and 2002 are excluded because of insufficient data).
Large centers are able to achieve economies of scale and show overhead costs (e.g., facilities 
and administration) 4 to 6 percentage points below their smaller counterparts, as shown in 
Table 7. These lower levels of overhead typically outstrip total margins, creating a substantial 
advantage for larger DTCs. Lower overhead allows large centers to direct more resources to 
patient care, make critical IT and other system investments, and hire highly-qualified, essential 
personnel (e.g., qualified CFOs). One can also assume that larger organizations have become 
larger over time because of the skill and capabilities of their executive management. Size is no 
guarantee of better operations, but the added revenues create the opportunity to devote more 
resources to core functions.
FIguRE 6. median number of Days in Accounts Receivable, 
FQHCs vs. non-FQHCs, 2001–2007
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tABlE 6. Key indicators by DtC size, 2003–2007
FQHC mEDIAn 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Margin—Medium FQHCs 2.13 2.73 0.96 1.82 0.56
Margin—Large FQHCs 4.76 8.01 4.55 1.10 1.69
Current Ratio—Medium FQHCs 1.61 1.54 1.54 1.65 1.70
Current Ratio—Large FQHCs 2.62 2.64 2.23 2.12 2.31
Days Cash on Hand—Medium FQHCs 26.44 28.52 18.23 14.85 23.03
Days Cash on Hand—Large FQHCs 24.99 46.79 30.26 42.23 27.47
Non-FQHC Median 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Margin—Medium non-FQHCs 1.63 .085 0.98 1.16 2.07
Margin—Large non-FQHCs -0.18 -0.04 -0.09 0.04 0.02
Current Ratio—Medium non-FQHCs 1.63 0.85 0.98 1.16 2.07
Current Ratio—Large non-FQHCs 0.77 0.78 0.96 1.38 4.75
Days Cash on Hand—Medium non-FQHCs 18.87 1.89 6.28 4.88 4.73
Days Cash on Hand—Large non-FQHCs 1.74 3.01 16.04 25.47 46.67
tABlE 7. share of total costs devoted to 
facilities/administration, 2006 and 2007
FACIlItIEs/ADmInIstRAtIon %    2006 2007
Statewide Median 32.4% 32.8%
Small DTCs 38.7% 34.5%
Medium DTCs 32.7% 33.5%
Large DTCs 31.5% 30.6%
   beiNG ruN bY exeCuTiveS who uNderSTaNd maNaGemeNT aNd have 
Clear reSPoNSibiliTieS
During the interviews conducted as part of this study, health center executives described  
the following overall factors as critical to their financial success:
  having, or coming to have, a detailed executive-level understanding of health center operations; 
  use of thorough and accurate data and reports, facilitated through the use of IT systems, 
alerting executives to problems and anomalies; 
  establishing clear responsibilities for individual employees, including setting 
targets and priorities; 
  establishing clear reporting structures for each employee and department and clear 
accountability for outcomes; and
  having, or coming to have, a clear understanding of costs and revenue sources. 
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The web of reimbursement regimes, with their differing rate methodologies, billing procedures, 
incentive payments, payment delays and other requirements, creates an unusually complex 
financial management environment. Systematic underfunding makes it difficult for health centers, 
especially smaller ones, to attract and retain the level of financial talent they need. Study advisors 
agreed that many health centers lack the expertise necessary to deal with this environment. 
Strategies short of higher reimbursement or administrative simplification can help. Centers 
often encounter difficulty in understanding the nature of the expertise they need and in 
successfully identifying and recruiting qualified candidates, which could be addressed through 
the availability of technical assistance.
  imProviNG Provider ProduCTiviTY aNd PaTieNT reCruiTmeNT 
Provider productivity may be the single most powerful factor determining the relative financial 
health of different health centers. Low productivity can be explained by a variety of factors, 
including high patient no-show rates, inadequate demand, poorly managed workflow and 
patient scheduling, and inadequate provider support (reflected in excessive provider time spent 
in administrative or other non-billable activities).
Interviewees discussed using practice management systems to better quantify exactly how 
much provider time was spent with patients and to better understand productivity variations 
between providers. 
Strategies to improve provider productivity included:
	 ensuring strong bonds and working relationships between executives and providers;
	 building multidisciplinary care teams that are flexible and provide functions that 
support the provider;
	 redesigning workflows to eliminate inefficient and unnecessary steps;
	 sharing provider performance data, along with the organization’s financial data, with 
providers; 
	 ensuring each provider has access to at least two exam rooms per session; and 
	 instituting incentive plans. 
Over a longer time frame, centers have altered facilities to create additional exam rooms per 
provider, so providers can more efficiently move from exam room to exam room, with patients 
ready and waiting. When necessary, executives also laid off providers, either because of 
inadequate performance or to adjust provider capacity to fit facility volume. 
To address insufficient patient demand, successful managers have aggressively marketed 
health center services, often with an emphasis on patients covered by Medicaid. The most 
effective have established strategic relationships with community organizations in a position to 
direct many patients to the center. They have also developed partnerships with managed care 
plans to make sure that eligible patients are enrolled in Medicaid. 
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No-show rates as high as 80% were reported in certain centers, with an average of 50% not being 
unusual. Centers use a variety of strategies to reduce no-show rates, which pose a workflow 
challenge, with varying results. Advance reminder calls have proved most effective when they 
result in an actual conversation rather than just leaving a message. Some center use vans to pick 
up certain patients, or ensure a modicum of “open scheduling,” leaving open time on providers’ 
schedules to accommodate same-day and walk-in appointments. Regardless of these efforts, 
however, most health centers appear to have difficulty holding the no-show rate below 25%. 
  imProviNG billiNG aNd ColleCTioNS
Interviewees from sites that turned around their financial performance commonly found that 
they had lacked an efficient billing system, with some services never billed and many billed 
inaccurately, requiring re-submission (effectively duplicating the work needed to get paid).  
They described the necessity of understanding each step of the billing process and identifying 
steps that were insufficiently defined or where responsibility was unclear. Improved IT 
systems, used properly, have enabled them to bill far more efficiently and accurately, as well 
as to identify and correct the most common billing mistakes. These systems carefully tracked 
average collections per encounter by payer, and overall collection rates, which typically 
increased from the high-80% range to the high-90% range. 
  moderNiziNG FaCiliTieS 
Virtually every interviewee associated with a strong or improving organization has modernized 
or otherwise altered his or her facility to improve care, increase productivity, improve 
operations, attract and retain patients, and/or attract and retain personnel. They have 
optimized space, creating more exam rooms (i.e., more revenue-generating space). Some 
optimize attractive space available for patient care by placing administrative functions in less 
desirable spaces and locations. 
  maiNTaiNiNG FiSCal viGilaNCe 
All those interviewed watch costs closely. They participate in some form of pooled purchasing, 
saving on medical and non-medical supplies, although these average 10% to 15% of total 
expenditures and the opportunities for savings have a limited impact on the overall budget. 
Most, at this point, participate in a 340B discount pharmacy plan through which they can 
purchase drugs at steeply discounted prices and earn money by selling them to patients at a 
positive margin (while also providing a discount to patients). They limit perks, like Blackberries, 
and are judicious about conference fees and other discretionary spending. 
  PurSuiNG uNreSTriCTed FuNdiNG
The fundraising strategies of successful health centers vary widely. Some, by virtue of location 
near and visibility to a wealthier community, have successfully adopted aggressive private 
fundraising efforts. Others concentrate solely on government grants or private foundation 
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opportunities. Small centers are clearly at a disadvantage, having fewer resources to devote 
to fundraising. But strong executives, regardless of center size, use their expertise to mobilize 
support to bring additional funding to their organizations. However, fundraising is an adjunct 
to their central strategy of close, careful, and engaged management of revenues, expenses, 
personnel, and all aspects of operations.
  develoPiNG aNd maiNTaiNiNG STroNG board GoverNaNCe
FQHC boards are mandated to include a majority of consumer members. This is advantageous 
for effective program planning, outreach, and marketing purposes, but the requirement can 
limit the ability of FQHCs to recruit candidates who can provide strong technical expertise, 
business and strategic acumen, and/or financial and fundraising support. The most successful 
FQHCs retain a healthy balance of consumer and outside perspectives and heed the best advice 
among members of a diverse and dynamic board. 
whaT FaCTorS aFFeCT The dTC SeCTor aS a whole?
While some health centers perform better than others, the majority of distress is attributable  
to a challenging payment environment where centers:
 are underpaid for ambulatory care services;
 experience significant delays in expected payments; and
 assume a large administrative burden of differing requirements from the multiple managed care plans that cover patients enrolled in public programs.
  uNderPaYmeNT aNd delaYS
New York’s health centers serve populations that are largely poor or uninsured. On average,  
63% of their patients are uninsured or enrolled in Medicaid, Child Health Plus (CHP)  
or Family Health Plus (FHP), according to AHCF data collected for this study, making them  
heavily dependent on the policymakers who determine payment policy. As discussed below,  
the underpayments are attributable to three sources: Medicaid, commercial insurers,  
and indigent care payments from New York State. 
While routine Medicaid patient reimbursement has been relatively prompt, payment of  
Medicaid rate add-ons and grants (and, until recently, indigent care compensation and rate 
adjustments) are subject to long and unpredictable delays, sometimes as long as two years.  
At the very least, these delays hinder financial planning and efficient management of resources. 
Fragile providers, with narrow financial margins and barely enough cash on hand to cover  
the next payroll, are less able to absorb delays without threatening full-scale financial crisis. 
[Note: In 2010, NYSDOH expects to implement monthly payments of add-ons; however, the 
State’s budget crisis may delay implementation.]
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unDERpAYmEnt AnD DElAYs In mEDICAID FEE-FoR-sERvICE REImBuRsEmEnt
FQHCs versus non-FQHCs: Medicaid is the single most important revenue stream to New York’s 
health centers. Among these, FQHCs have a special reimbursement status under Medicaid which 
accounts for their stronger financial position. The federal Benefits Improvement and Protection 
Act (BIPA) of 2000 (Public Law No. 105-554) effectively requires state Medicaid programs to 
reimburse FQHCs at cost. New York State does this by providing “wrap-around” payments to 
make up the difference between cost and the lower rates paid to FQHCs by managed care plans. 
The base rate in New York reflects health center costs reported during 1999 and 2000, which are 
then inflated annually by the Medicare Economic Index (MEI).
While providing a more robust and predictable Medicaid revenue stream, the MEI clearly does 
not keep pace with the actual rise in health care costs. Thus, the MEI rose 2.4% per year over 
the past 17 years,1 while health care spending averaged 7.5% annually between 2002 and 2004.2 
Capital costs are reimbursed as an add-on to the Medicaid base rate. Even with this special 
reimbursement arrangement, Medicaid rates fall significantly below FQHC costs, as shown in 
the table and charts on following page. 
FIguRE 7. DtC payer mix statewide
medicare
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uninsured
16%
medicaid managed Care/
FhP/ChP
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medicaid FFS
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2%
1  between 1992 and 2009, the mei has ranged from a low of 1.6%in 2009 to a high of 3.2% in 1992, for an average of 2.4% per year. Source: http://www.
cms.hhs.gov/SustainableGratesConFact/downloads/sgr2009f.pdf  kent.clemens@cms.hhs.gov, November 2008
2  S. heffler et al., “u.S. health Spending Projections for 2004–2014,” health affairs 24 (2005): w74–w86 (published online 23 February 2005; 10.1377/
hlthaff.w5.74).
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tABlE 8. median medicaid Fee-for-service Base Rate per visit, FQHCs vs. non-FQHCs
 
mEDIAn mEDICAID BAsE RAtE
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Non-FQHC - Hospital-Affiliated  143.27  143.27  153.02  162.74  153.01  162.74  162.74 
Non-FQHC - Non-Hospital-Affiliated  91.55  91.55  92.21  102.77  102.77  112.44  121.24 
Non-FQHC - Total  102.77  102.77  102.77  125.18  112.49  129.12  131.33 
FQHC  106.93  111.12  117.11  120.46  120.64  124.16  130.70 
total Comprehensive DtCs  105.83  110.34  112.38  122.43  120.04  126.64  131.33 
tABlE 9. median medicaid Cost per visit, FQHCs vs. non-FQHCs
 
mEDIAn Cost pER vIsIt
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Non-FQHC - Hospital-Affiliated 158.36 143.67  130.90  131.74 158.32 152.21 162.43 
Non-FQHC - Non-Hospital-Affiliated  133.19  166.18  147.97 135.04 136.46  150.96  140.18 
Non-FQHC - Total 154.56 143.67 134.60  131.74 146.45  150.96 158.30 
FQHC  121.97  128.73 126.30  137.08 145.70 150.55  151.39 
total Comprehensive DtCs 123.72 132.89 131.24 137.03 145.70 150.75 154.15 
FIguRE 8. medicaid Fee-for service Base Rate vs. Cost per visit,  
FQHCs, 2001–2007
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non-FQHCs: Non-FQHCs are not protected by Federal reimbursement requirements and face 
Medicaid underpayment from two sources: 
1.  Fee-for-service rates, which until recently were determined in a manner similar to those for 
FQHCs, were frozen by the State from 1995 until September 2009, when the State revised the 
Medicaid reimbursement methodology (see below). Assuming a 3% annual increase, costs 
rose more than 50% during the period when rates were frozen. 
  (The relative disadvantage of non-FQHCs is masked in Figures 8 and 9 because the rate 
freeze caused many older non-FQHCs to convert to FQHCs or go out of business during the 
study period, while new non-FQHCs have been created with fairly high Medicaid rates. Thus, 
even though the rate was frozen for each individual organization, the median for the group as 
a whole rose over time.)
2.  Non-FQHCs receive discounted payment by Medicaid managed care plans without having 
the protection of the FQHC wrap-around. Although managed care payments vary by plan, a 
previous study shows payments to average 85% of the Medicaid base rate.3 (In conversations 
conducted as part of this study, CFOs put the number below that level.) A health center with 
an average payer mix (see Figure 7 above) and an average mix of Medicaid fee-for-service 
and managed care patients (21% and 26%, respectively) will receive Medicaid revenues 8% 
lower than the base rate shown in Table 8 above and Figure 9 below. 
Although the Medicaid base rates have been supplemented with certain add-on payments 
(discussed below), such severe and persistent underpayment calls into question the fiscal viability 
of any non-FQHC. The fact that some centers survive despite such large and persistent losses is 
explained by the number of hospital-backed DTCs in which the hospital subsidizes losses.
FIguRE 9. medicaid Fee-for-service Base Rate vs. Cost per visit, non-FQHCs, 2001–2007
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3  New York’s Primary Care reimbursement System, a roadmap to better outcome, prepared by the Primary Care development Corporation and rSm 
mcGladrey, inc., September 2006.
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medicaid payment Reform: Beginning in 2008, New York State adopted a new method of paying for 
Medicaid fee-for-service ambulatory care visits, which is being phased in over a four-year period, 
and a new set of rate enhancements. Under the new system, ambulatory care visits are being 
reimbursed using Ambulatory Payment Groups (or APGs), which are weighted for the intensity 
of services rendered during the visit. The State implemented APGs for hospital DTCs as of 
December 2008, and just received Federal approval to implement them for freestanding DTCs and 
other non-FQHCs. Under the current plan, the approval will be retroactive to September 2009. 
Although APGs clearly benefit non-FQHC DTCs, the advantage to FQHCs is unclear at this time. 
One study shows that of 60 FQHCs, 39 would receive slightly higher rates (on average 1.4% 
higher), while 21 would experience losses. For FQHCs, the APG system is optional, while for non-
FQHCs it is mandatory. 
For both FQHCs and non-FQHCs, APG payment is limited to fee-for-service Medicaid patients, 
a minority and shrinking portion of all health center patients (21% Medicaid fee-for-service 
compared to 26% managed care). To date, only two FQHCs in New York State have opted in 
to APGs, and one of these is operated by a hospital that wanted consistency with its other 
ambulatory care reimbursement.
In addition to the APG rate, the State adopted rate enhancements for certain measures that 
improve primary care quality or access, such as asthma and diabetes nurse educators, social 
work counseling, and centers that provide evening and weekend hours. Significantly, Medicaid 
recently created a $70 million incentive pool for doctors and clinics that meet national medical 
home standards. 
unDERpAYmEnt AnD DElAYs In mEDICAID mAnAgED CARE pAYmEnt
While the State pays Medicaid wrap-around payments on an ongoing basis as health centers file 
evidence of paid Managed Care Organization (MCO) claims, FQHCs and others contacted for this 
study reported significant delays, in large part because of lags in the claims payment process, 
including adjudication of denials and appeals, by the Medicaid MCOs. 
Additionally, health centers reported losing Medicaid payments for the care of presumptively eligible 
Medicaid or SCHIP enrollees who were not enrolled into a health plan until after the 90-day 
billing window elapsed. The high churn rate of publicly-insured patients presents a challenge 
to health centers that may lack the capacity to check whether each patient is to be billed under 
Medicaid fee-for-service or to the managed care plan. Exacerbating this problem are managed care 
plan rosters that are not fully electronic and searchable rosters that are not necessarily up to date.
Finally, health center directors also expressed frustration at delays when new providers are 
credentialed by health plans. Each physician must be credentialed separately with each plan, 
involving slightly different requirements and procedures, despite the fact that the information 
required is essentially identical (see below). It is not unusual for a provider to see patients 
for three to six months before being able to submit claims. Given the challenges of provider 
recruitment and retention, some centers could experience this problem several times each year. 
Causes and Contributors to Health Center Financial Distress (continued)
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Although some level of denials is necessary and appropriate, including for non-covered services, 
some denials appear to be a function of inefficient and complicated credentialing procedures and 
enrollment processes that may need to be re-evaluated.
special medicaid Add-on payments: New York’s DTCs have, in recent years, been eligible 
for two “add-on” payments that supplement their base Medicaid rates: a managed care 
transition payment (recently replaced by an electronic health record transition payment) 
and a workforce recruitment and retention payment. While helpful, these payments have not 
necessarily closed the gap between costs and rates. Moreover, they are an unreliable source 
of income for several reasons: 
	 funding is subject to annual legislative appropriation and may be subject to 
federal approval; 
	 receipt of payments is unpredictable and frequently delayed as a consequence; and
	 total amounts vary from year to year (see Table 10 below). 
Health centers typically budget conservatively for the managed care and recruitment add-on 
payments, because of their unpredictability, or exclude them from budget projections altogether. 
With regular Medicaid payments often falling short of costs of service, these extra payments are 
necessary to make up that shortfall in covering the regular daily expenses of many centers. The 
lack of predictability of the timing and amount of these payments, however, contributes to rather 
than alleviates health centers’ chronic cash squeeze.
tABlE 10. managed Care transition payments (Calendar Years 2002–2007)
mAnAgED CARE tRAnsItIon pAYmEnts (In mIllIons)
CY 2002 CY 2003 CY 2004 CY 2005 CY 2006 CY 2007
$19.6 $9.8 $0 $9.8 $29.5 $9.8
Source: New York State department of health transition payment data.
Beginning with the 2008-9 budget year, the managed care transition payment has been eliminated 
and replaced with a new payment designed to compensate health centers for the costs of 
implementing electronic health records (EHR) systems that “meet such standards as may be 
established by the commissioner of health.”4
The State set aside approximately $9.8 million annually for these payments in 2008; that amount 
was reduced to $7.4 million for 2009. Like the managed care transition payments that preceded 
them, future EHR payment amounts are not mandated in law and will be subject to legislative 
negotiations. While generally supportive, some health centers and other stakeholders interviewed 
for this study expressed concern that the payments would further exacerbate the gap between 
high- and low-performing health centers that lack the capacity to select and implement an EHR 
4  New York Social Services law, Section 364-j-2 as revised. according to a NYS department of health letter to health center administrators 
(october 7, 2008), to qualify, health centers must meet minimum payer mix criteria and have in place an electronic health record (ehr) that is 
capable of and used for exchanging health information with other computer systems according to national standards; is certified by the Certification 
Commission for health information Technology; is capable of and used for supporting electronic prescribing; and is capable and used for providing 
relevant clinical information to assist clinicians in decision making.
Causes and Contributors to Health Center Financial Distress (continued)
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system. Health centers and other stakeholders also noted that the time lags and unpredictability 
that plagued the managed care transition payments continue under the EHR payments.
The current status of both funding streams illustrates their level of unreliability:
  Three years after re-purposing the managed care transition payments to support the 
implementation of electronic medical records systems, health centers have not yet been told 
how much they will receive or when they will receive it, because NYSDOH is still awaiting the 
required annual Federal approval of the State Plan Amendment.
  Recruitment and retention payments are also subject to annual Federal approval of the State 
Plan Amendment and, in the absence of such approval, NYSDOH has informed centers that 
these payments have been suspended as of January 1, 2010.
unDERpAYmEnt AnD DElAYs In InDIgEnt CARE pAYmEnts 
Like many states, New York has created an Indigent Care Pool that offsets a portion of the 
losses incurred by health centers in caring for the uninsured. The pool is a fixed figure in the 
State budget, and payments are allocated according to a formula that pays for a greater share of 
losses to health centers treating a larger proportion of uninsured patients. In recent years, the 
pool has covered approximately 30% of health center indigent care losses; in contrast, hospital 
compensation from a similar indigent care pool averages 65% of hospital uninsured losses. 
Although the DTC pool is small relative to costs incurred, it is nevertheless a significant resource 
to health centers, often representing 5% to 10% of total income.
The indigent care pool has been funded in the range of $50 million in recent State budgets, 
and the State is working to secure a Federal waiver that would double the size of the pool. The 
prospects for approval are uncertain, as is the projected pay-out, because a new pool will include 
a new set of providers (outpatient mental health clinics) for the first time. Although this proposed 
expansion is a positive development in many ways, it will be eroded by continued expansion of 
the DTC sector resulting from the State’s HEAL grant programs and Federal stimulus monies, as 
well as the conversion of hospital satellites and outpatient departments to DTC status. The only 
certainty it is that the pool is unlikely to address indigent care losses fully. 
Indigent care payments are subject to two- to three-year delays between the time a service is 
delivered (when costs are incurred) and the time of payment. For instance, for services delivered 
in 2007, health centers submit cost reports, based on annual audits; the Health Department 
tallies the data in late 2008 and early 2009; and the pool is funded in the 2009-2010 State budget. 
Payments then typically come toward the end of the State fiscal year. 
Until this year, annual DTC indigent care payments were made in one or two lump sums, in 
contrast to hospital indigent care, which (although also subject a two- to three-year delay) is 
paid on a monthly basis. It is far easier to manage cash with regular payments than with lump 
sums that come unpredictably once or twice a year. Recognizing this problem, the New York State 
Department of Health began monthly payments for indigent care in 2010.
Comparing monies available for indigent care to the total number of uninsured is a useful way 
of looking at the adequacy of indigent care payments. Data from selected states indicate that, 
Causes and Contributors to Health Center Financial Distress (continued)
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although New York is clearly ahead of some other states—indeed, many states provide little or no 
funding to compensate providers for the uninsured—it is not as generous as others. 
tABlE 11. Indigent Care pool Funds per uninsured:selected state Examples
stAtE FY 09*
EstImAtED 
unInsuRED  
In stAtE (2007)**
pRImARY CARE 
unCompEnsAtED 
CARE pool FunDs 
pER unInsuRED
ElIgIBlE  
EntItIEs***
California $ 27,000,000 6,701,890 $ 4.03 FQHCs and  other providers
Colorado $ 33,951,786 813,188 $ 41.75 FQHCs and  other providers
New Jersey $ 40,000,000 1,344,323 $ 29.75 FQHCs
New York $ 54,500,000 2,590,364 $ 21.04 FQHCs and  other providers
Ohio $ 2,150,000 1,229,769 $ 1.75 FQHCs
Texas $ 0 5,832,884 $ — None
*National association of Community health Centers. “losing Ground: State Funding to health Centers declines amid 
economic downturn (State Policy report #21). august 2008.”
**www.statehealthfacts.org urban institute and kaiser Commission on medicaid and the uninsured estimates based on 
the Census bureau’s march 2007 and 2008 Current Population Survey.
***National association of Community health Centers. “Securing State Funding for health Centers (State health Policy 
report #13). November 2006.”
unDERpAYmEnt AnD DElAYs In FEDERAl FQHC gRAnts
In addition to Indigent Care Pool payments, FQHCs (not Look-Alikes) receive Federal grants under 
Section 330 of the Public Health Services Act, which are intended to offset the costs of caring for the 
uninsured. Under Federal law, FQHCs are required to see all patients regardless of ability to pay. 
Grants range from the low $100,000s to more than $1 million and, once established, continue 
annually as long as the FQHC continues to meet Federal standards. Although a reliable source of 
annual revenue, initial grant amounts reflect the level of funding available in that particular year 
and not necessarily the number of uninsured patients treated. While the Federal government 
periodically adjusts base grant amounts, these grants are not indexed to cost growth, nor are 
they directly related to changes in the uninsured burden borne by the health centers. As a result, 
Federal FQHC grants frequently bear little relationship to the actual volume or cost of uninsured 
patients served. FQHCs in New York and nationally consistently report that their Section 330 
grants cover a decreasing proportion of their uninsured costs. 
According to 2007 State and national Uniform Data System (UDS) data, the average Section 330 
grant per medical user in New York FQHCs was $93, compared to the national average of $121 and 
the national median of $135. In addition, UDS data for New York FQHCs indicate that the Federal 
grant awards per uninsured health center user have been eroding in recent years as growth in the 
volume of the uninsured population has outpaced growth in grant dollars.
Causes and Contributors to Health Center Financial Distress (continued)
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Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), many health centers 
received additional allocations to compensate for the increase in the uninsured attributable to the 
economic downturn. However, these are one-time only funds that must be spent over a two-year 
period, and they will not solve the system’s underlying problems. 
unDERpAYmEnt AnD DElAYs BY CommERCIAl InsuRERs
Approximately 25% of patient visits across all health centers are commercially insured, making 
commercial insurance a significant source of revenue for DTCs. Actual levels differ by health 
center and by community. In particular, rural health centers tend to be the only or the major 
source of care in their communities and thus see higher percentages of privately insured patients. 
Among upstate non-FQHCs, commercial insurance pays for 40% of center visits, more than the 
visits provided to Medicaid beneficiaries and the uninsured combined. 
A recent study of the adequacy of commercial insurance payments found that, for FQHCs, 
commercial insurance rates were on average $38 lower than Medicaid fee-for-service rates, 
$17 lower than Medicare rates, and $41 lower than the actual cost of providing care. The 
report did not analyze commercial insurance payments for other comprehensive DTCs, but 
discussions with health centers and other stakeholders indicate that reimbursement rates for 
these providers are also well below cost.
  admiNiSTraTive burdeN oF CoNTraCTiNG wiTh mulTiPle maNaGed Care PlaNS
Prior to the managed care era, providers dealt with a single State Medicaid agency with a single set 
of requirements, a single payment method, and a single automated billing and collection process. 
With the move to managed care, the State effectively outsourced much of its Medicaid role to some 
19 managed care plans, each of which has a small portion of the market, different requirements, 
and different payment methods, and each of which is in a different state of automation.
A single health center will typically contract with six to eight of these plans to ensure their 
ability to serve a significant portion of patients residing in their community. A single plan’s 
members constitute a relatively small segment of a center’s patient population. Similarly, a 
center’s patients constitute a small segment of a single plan’s membership. The price for this 
system is heavy: health centers shoulder a large and expensive administrative burden and have 
little clout to influence plan behavior. 
To receive reimbursement from a managed care plan, each physician working for a health center 
must be credentialed by that plan. As described above, the credentialing process varies by 
plan and involves collecting data and validating a large number of documents, such as license, 
education and training, malpractice coverage, and claims history. A physician’s services cannot be 
billed until credentials are approved, which typically takes three to six months, creating payment 
delays that can last for months after the physician has been hired. 
This credentialing process is one example of onerous and wasteful administrative burdens with 
which DTCs must contend. Each physician must be credentialed separately with each of the six to 
eight plans doing business with that health center. Each plan has slightly different requirements 
and procedures, despite the fact that the information required is essentially identical. 
Causes and Contributors to Health Center Financial Distress (continued)
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Causes and Contributors to Health Center Financial Distress (continued)
Lack of standardization also neutralizes incentives that plans offer providers for improving 
outcomes. The State evaluates and rewards plans for the quality of care rendered. Plans, in turn, 
frequently offer incentives to providers that improve on the quality indicators that affect the plan’s 
rating by the State. Those indicators differ by plan, so providers must face the varying incentives 
of six or eight plans, each having a small segment of a center’s patient population. 
The complexity and administrative burden of coping with multiple plans also includes 
preauthorization procedures, formulary requirements and differing referral networks, in addition 
to credentialing, billing and collections, and quality incentives. The net effect is an expensive and 
wasteful process that begs for standardization, either at the initiative of the managed care plans 
or imposed by the State as part of its contract requirements.
  bureauCraTiC barrierS To merGerS aNd aCQuiSiTioNS 
Health center mergers, acquisitions, and consolidations offer potential strategies for 
strengthening or saving health centers at financial risk and with them, the essential access to 
care they offer vulnerable community members. 
Health center leaders interviewed for this study perceive mergers and acquisitions to involve 
very long and complex processes with particularly confusing and burdensome State regulatory 
requirements. For example, in one complex health center acquisition, myriad regulatory 
processes resulted in delays of up to two years in certain State payments, causing financial 
uncertainty and severe cash flow problems for the parent organization. Another center CEO 
cited bureaucratic difficulties that discouraged him from pursuing a merger. Guidance, clear 
information, and coordination by regulatory authorities are clearly needed to streamline the 
steps and sequence of approvals. Also needed are resources for obtaining expert assistance in 
navigating the process. Interviewees reported difficulty in communicating to State officials the 
urgency of the fact that, without action, closure of a failing center was imminent. 
Understandably, each situation is unique, presenting difficulty in establishing standard protocols 
for mergers and acquisitions. For example, a merger may be between two FQHCs, or between 
an FQHC and a non-FQHC, which involves a scope change with HRSA. There may be one site 
or multiple sites involved, each of which may require inspection. The centers may be in close 
proximity or in different parts of the State, presenting challenges to the federally required board 
configuration and often triggering a new, blended Medicaid reimbursement rate from the State. 
Table 12 illustrates the complex nature of a merger, including steps necessary to complete 
the transaction. In some cases, State processes must be coordinated with Federal and legal 
processes. For example, the merging centers may need to request Federal government approvals 
for expansion of the FQHC 330 scope and new Medicare provider numbers; pursue legal and 
financial transactions such as an asset sale agreement; and receive State Attorney General and 
NY Supreme Court approval of asset sale by a nonprofit center, transfers of building ownership 
and leases, and transactions around securing grants, loans, and other sources of financing. 
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tABlE 12. nYsDoH Regulatory processes Related to Health Center mergers, 
Acquisitions & Consolidations 
stAtE REgulAtoRY  
REQuIREmEnts unDER wHAt CIRCumstAnCEs nEEDED REvIEw AgEnCY
Emergency 
Approval  
to maintain an 
operating  
Health Center 
A provider may file an Emergency Certificate of Need (CON) 
application to maintain a health center as an operating entity 
while efforts are underway to comply with the complete set of 
regulatory requirements associated with a merger/acquisition. 
The approval of the Emergency CON application sets the 
retroactive date for licensing, rate changes and billing that will 
be accorded when a positive conclusion to the regulatory process 
has been reached. 
Reviewed and approved 
by: Bureau of Project 
Management, Division  
of Health Facility Planning, 
Office of Health Systems 
Management, New York 
State Department of Health 
Certificate of  
need Approval  
for Change  
in ownership or 
merger
Per CON regulations, a provider must file a Full Review CON 
application for actions that entail “changes in ownership, mergers, 
consolidations, or creation of an active parent” regardless of the 
associated cost. This applies to the wholesale consolidation of two 
entities, as in the case of the Institute for Family Health assuming 
the full assets and liabilities of the Mid-Hudson Institute, and the 
Mid-Hudson Institute ceasing as both an independently governed 
organization and a licensed Article 28 provider.
The Full Review CON application is also used to request approval 
to undertake any capital changes (renovations or new construc-
tion or equipment replacement) that the applicant provider pro-
poses to undertake in connection with the merger/acquisition.
Reviewed by: Bureau  
of Project Management, 
Division of Health Facility 
Planning, NYS Department 
of Health Office of Health 
Systems Management, New 
York State Department of 
Health; Approved by:  
(1) State Hospital Planning 
and Review Council; and (2) 
Public Health Council
Certificate  
of need Approval  
for Assumption  
of an Existing 
Health Center by 
Another provider
Per CON regulations, a provider must file an Administrative 
Review CON application for actions that involve the “operation of 
extension clinics, addition of primary care sites, and addition or 
deletion of part-time clinic services” and that entail capital costs 
of less than $10 million (this figure will rise to $15 million under 
proposed new regulations).
As in the case of Hudson River Healthcare and Valentine Lane, 
this applies when one provider “closes” an extension clinic and/or 
a provider “opens” an extension clinic by assuming the operations 
of a prior extension clinic at that site.
Reviewed and approved 
by: Bureau of Project 
Management, Division  
of Health Facility Planning, 
Office of Health Systems 
Management, New York 
State Department of Health
medicaid 
Reimbursement 
Rate setting 
Approval
A merger/acquisition may involve a provider appeal to NYSDOH 
for a change in the organization’s Medicaid fee-for-service (FFS) 
rate, based on a significant change in the provider’s scope and/or 
to reflect any new capital costs incurred during the transaction. 
If a new Medicaid FFS rate is granted, it is typically retroactive 
to the regulatory approval date—the Emergency CON approval, 
where applicable, or the Full Review CON approval. 
Office of Medicaid 
Management,  
New York State Department 
of Health
new medicaid 
locator Codes/
provider  
numbers 
Billing can occur only after NYSDOH issues site-specific billing 
codes to a new operator of a site—regardless of whether there was a 
prior operator at that site. This is supposed to be triggered internally 
by NYSDOH staff. Providers have experienced delays in the issuance 
of these billing codes which have in turn caused cash flow issues. 
Office of Medicaid 
Management, NYS 
Department of Health 
licensing  
& Inspections  
of Acquired 
Facilities 
Typically, NYSDOH inspects a new site prior to issuing an operat-
ing certificate. The requirements are less certain, and may be 
discretionary, in the case of provider changes at existing sites. 
Bureau of Health Facilities 
Surveillance, NYS 
Department of Health
Sources: Communications with NYSdoh, Neil Calman (iFh), Peter epp (rSm mcGladrey) and kate breslin (ChCaNYS).
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A full acquisition or merger will typically require a full Certificate of Need (CON), involving a 
transfer of assets or governance, which typically takes about six to eight months (or longer if 
the State requires additional information). A shorter administrative review CON, with a two- to 
three-month process, may be possible when one organization assumes a site from another. An 
“emergency” CON can be approved in a much shorter period of time to allow the parent health 
center to operate the acquired sites, so that eventually any new, higher rates for the acquired 
entity would be retroactive to the emergency CON approval date. The acquiring health center 
would need the financial capacity to “carry” the acquired site pending the receipt of full CON 
approval and site-specific Medicaid “locator” codes, before the acquiring center actually receives 
any payments or rate increases associated with services provided at the acquired sites.
According to State officials, the CON process has improved in recent years and there are 
ongoing efforts to streamline the system further. The NYS Department of Health Bureau of 
Project Management, which oversees the CON process, is planning to create a web-based CON 
application, which should facilitate submissions of completed requests. The department is 
also placing more information and instructions about the CON process on its website. Officials 
also note that when a health center inquires about a merger or acquisition, the Bureau of 
Project Management will facilitate a face-to-face meeting with center leaders and individuals 
from various State offices to help determine the required processes. However, individuals 
interviewed for this study felt that, although these meetings are helpful, arranging them was 
difficult and required a long lead time. 
These attempts to improve and streamline the process are welcome steps. Moreover, as Federal 
health reform is implemented and more people seek needed health care, additional funds 
will be available to help health centers meet that growing demand. In a reformed health care 
environment, DTCs’ role as a source of high-quality, accessible primary care will become even 
more important, and it will be even more imperative that the underlying structure of the DTC 
system is sound. A range of actors—from State government to health care payers to philanthropic 
organizations to the centers themselves—have a critical role to play in strengthening New York 
State’s health centers to allow them to take full advantage of new resources and continue to 
provide timely, high-quality care.
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trengthening New York’s Comprehensive Diagnostic and Treatment Centers (DTCs) 
will require action by multiple sectors: State government, health care payers, 
philanthropic organizations, and the health centers themselves. We outline 
recommendations for each of these groups below, with a focus on four areas for change: 
pRomotE stREngtHEnIng AnD REstRuCtuRIng oF tHE pRImARY CARE sECtoR. 
Because FQHCs tend to be stronger than non-FQHCs, and large centers tend to be financially 
stronger and more sustainable than smaller ones, policymakers and foundations should 
support health centers to take full advantage of the FQHC expansion funding available under 
the Federal health reform law. Strategies include expanding existing sites and services, 
establishing new sites, and facilitating mergers and acquisitions of existing organizations. 
Significant hurdles include the need for resources to develop business plans, conduct due 
diligence, foot start-up costs, and navigate complex, bureaucratic regulatory barriers to 
obtaining State and Federal approvals and establishing reimbursement streams. 
stREngtHEn DtCs’ BusInEss AnD FInAnCIAl mAnAgEmEnt.
New York State’s DTC leaders consistently report that strong business and financial 
management are essential for financially strong health centers. State policymakers, 
philanthropies, and health center advocates should provide targeted, coordinated support 
for management and governance interventions. Support for redesign of business operations 
offers the prospect of meeting many needs across a diverse range of health centers. Programs 
to provide consulting, redesign and technical assistance hold important potential, but 
development of the most effective interventions will also require careful assessment. 
ImpRovE tHE ADEQuACY, tImIng, AnD pREDICtABIlItY oF stAtE pAYmEnts. 
While routine Medicaid patient reimbursement has been relatively prompt, payment of Medicaid 
rate add-ons and grants (and, until recently, indigent care compensation and rate adjustments) 
are subject to long and unpredictable delays, sometimes as long as two years. These delays 
hinder financial planning and efficient management of resources. Fragile providers, with 
narrow financial margins and barely enough cash on hand to cover the next payroll, are less 
able to absorb delays without threatening full-scale financial crisis. It should be noted that in 
2010, NYSDOH expects to implement monthly payments of add-ons, though the State budget 
crisis has hampered implementation. 
EstABlIsH A sInglE FoCus on pRImARY CARE wItHIn tHE nEw YoRK stAtE DEpARtmEnt oF HEAltH.
New York State has made investment in primary care a key strategic priority to transform  
the State’s health care system, but responsibility for primary care issues, policy, and planning 
are spread across different departments and staff. A State Office of Primary Care could provide 
a single point of contact and coordination within the Health Department for the full range of 
primary care issues and providers. 
Recommendations
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Recommendations foR state GoveRnment
suppoRt DEvElopmEnt oF lARgE HEAltH CEntERs AnD HEAltH CEntER nEtwoRKs. 
make available technical assistance and due diligence resources to promote individual health 
center facility transitions or larger mergers and acquisitions.
make available support for start-up costs of individual health center facility expansions and 
transitions or larger mergers and acquisitions. Interim financial support, such as for the 
period between receipt of an emergency Certificate of Need (CON) and receipt of final CON 
and Medicaid payment approvals would be particularly helpful. This work would support an 
important purpose of the Emergency Loan Fund recommended below .
simplify acquisition and merger processes by providing clear information about regulatory 
requirements. Ensure single points of contact and coordination and streamlining of State approval 
processes, including for the Certificate of Need process, where changes are already underway.
Assess the impact and ensure the adequacy of new DtC rates under the Ambulatory Patient Group 
methodology which is just being implemented. Perhaps working in conjunction with philanthropic 
organizations, ensure that the payment methodology approximates actual cost growth and 
supports the additional services required by the medical home model of primary care. 
Increase indigent care payment levels for DtCs. Although the timeliness of indigent care 
payments has improved in 2010, payment levels remain disproportionately low. In recent years, 
the pool has covered approximately 30%of health center indigent care losses. In contrast, the 
New York State compensates 65% of hospital uninsured losses. Achieve parity in coverage, 
taking into account new entrants (new DTCs, mental health organizations) in the coverage pool.
Enact prompt payment rules to ensure Medicaid rate add-ons and adjustments and other 
payments are made in a timely manner. New York is starting to pay on a regular monthly basis 
as it does for hospitals, rather than in one or two unpredictable annual lump sum payments. 
Even better would be a periodic interim payment mechanism similar to that used by Medicare  
to smooth cash flow for hospitals.
standardize and streamline processes for managed care plans administering the State’s public 
insurance programs. The State should require maximum feasible standardization of all possible 
credentialing, billing, collections, quality incentive and preauthorization processes. Lack of 
standardization has a double negative impact by both creating delays in health center payment 
and adding needless and wasteful administrative costs and burdens. Credentialing appears to 
be the most important of these processes to be standardized.
Establish an Emergency loan Fund for health centers. Uncertain timing of guaranteed payments 
is an enormous burden that disrupts health center operations. The State should consider 
establishing an Emergency Working Capital Loan Fund to help health centers manage the cash 
flow uncertainties caused by payment delays and budget cuts. California offers a potential 
model (see Appendix 1).
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Create a dedicated body within the Department of Health with a sole focus on primary care, to ensure 
coordination, efficiency and effectiveness throughout the sector. Consider as a first step convening 
a workgroup or advisory board of primary care stakeholders throughout the State. this role will be 
particularly important in coordinating the state’s efforts to claim its share of the $11 billion in federal 
funds that will be available for community health centers via the health reform law.
Recommendations foR PhilanthRoPic oRGanizations 
support efforts to leverage Federal health reform funding for FQHCs. Funding for FQHCs presents 
the most important opportunity to strengthen and restructure the DTC sector in New York 
State. Foundations should collaborate with and support the Community Health Care Association 
of New York State and NYSDOH to help bring Federal resources to New York State FQHCs 
and ensure that those resources are used effectively. This would include making available 
the technical assistance services that will be needed by new and expanding FQHCs to support 
organizational development, operations and health facility planning, and health center start-up; 
and assisting organizations that are in the best position to provide significant, sustainable primary 
care services growth to underserved communities to develop competitive applications for 
Federal FQHC funding.
Assess the impact of new DtC rates under the Ambulatory Patient Group methodology which is 
just being implemented. Foundations could support analysis and modeling to ensure that the 
payment methodology approximates actual cost growth and supports the additional services 
required by the medical home model of primary care. 
support and fund health centers in consolidating centers’ “back office” and other functions to 
help streamline operations and reduce costs.
support management and governance interventions that will strengthen health center 
performance, perhaps by adopting a similar approach to that used by the Federal Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). HRSA responds to requests for technical 
assistance by conducting assessments and, based on the findings, arranging for and funding 
appropriate TA. Support may run the gamut from targeted interventions to embedding temporary 
consultants to assist with more substantial improvements or organizational turnarounds.
provide technical assistance to help DtCs jump-start their work to implement electronic health 
records, achieve medical home recognition, and improve quality. These initiatives have the 
potential for substantial incentive payments that could strengthen DTCs’ bottom line. Both 
State and Federal resources are available to help DTCs progress in these areas, but private 
funders can help ensure that the State’s DTCs are well-positioned to take on these activities and 
compete successfully for public dollars.
Convene key stakeholders in primary care, including State government, payers, and health centers, 
to share information, coordinate activities, and identify priorities and opportunities for the sector.
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Recommendations foR PayeRs
standardize and streamline processes for credentialing, billing, collections, quality incentive, 
and preauthorization processes. Lack of standardization has a double negative impact by both 
creating delays in health center payment and adding needless and wasteful administrative 
costs and burdens. Credentialing appears to be the most important of these processes to be 
standardized for DTC providers.
pay DtCs adequately for primary and preventive care. Most commercial payers reimburse DTCs 
at levels well below Medicaid. These payers must recognize that the care provided in DTCs 
is helping to save money by reducing avoidable complications and hospitalizations. Although 
health care reform will improve payments for some commercially-insured patients, it appears 
that wide gaps will remain for many or most commercially-insured patients cared for by DTCs.
Create incentive programs that support patient-centered medical homes and distinguished 
outcomes as evidenced by recognition programs.
market DtC services to attract new patients and encourage growth in the sector.
Recommendations foR health centeRs and advocacy oRGanizations 
Advocate for stable and rational Federal funding for FQHCs. FQHCs receive Federal grants under 
Section 330 of the Public Health Services Act, which are intended to offset the costs of caring 
for the uninsured. (Under Federal law, FQHCs are required to see all patients regardless of 
ability to pay.) Currently, the amount of 330 grants awarded an FQHC has more to do with 
funding available at the time of the award than the number of uninsured to be cared for. Base 
330 grant amounts change only occasionally and incrementally; therefore, the level of 330 
funding per uninsured patient varies significantly. Advocates should continue to make the case 
that 330 grants correspond to uninsured volumes, as well as cost growth. 
market DtC services to attract new patients and encourage growth in the sector.
Ensure coordination across DtCs to make the most of new Federal resources.
Invest in leaders’ and managers’ financial skills and training. One of the strongest indicators of 
a DTC’s financial success is its management’s skills and experience.
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Appendix 1. 
healTh CeNTer FouNdaTioN /GraNTmaker iNiTiaTiveS
T
he following is a scan of initiatives from national and state-based foundations 
whose purpose is to strengthen the ability of safety-net providers to care for their 
populations. This should not be considered a comprehensive analysis, but examples 
of programs that could serve as models for New York. 
national foundations
KREsgE FounDAtIon 
Caring Communities supports safety-net institutions and those providing health services to 
underserved populations in high-need rural and urban settings through: 
Health Clinic opportunity Fund—a national grant program developed in response to the economic 
crisis to help charitably funded clinics, public health clinics, and those designated federally 
qualified health center look-alikes sustain or increase their capacity to meet growing demand 
for their services. 
safety-net Enhancement Initiative attempts to strengthen cross-sector collaboration among 
community-based health-care agencies that provide primary-care services to low-income and 
vulnerable individuals. This grant opportunity has two parts: (1) a program planning and design 
phase and (2) a demonstration phase. It is designed to foster new models and approaches for 
health-care delivery that reduce health disparities and improve the health outcomes of adults 
and children living in underserved communities. 
safety-net Facility Improvement Fund supports new construction and renovation of clinics and 
other health care organizations so they may expand their facilities in order to increase access 
and enhance the quality of their services for underserved populations. Most grants are awarded 
in the form of a challenge grant during an organization’s capital campaign. 
state-based foundations 
CAlIFoRnIA
California HealthCare Foundation 
Emergency loan Fund: CHCF will make $10 million available to the Emergency Working 
Capital Loan Fund, a low-interest loan pool designed to ensure California’s safety-net clinics 
provide uninterrupted care in the wake of a $24 billion budget shortfall has ignited a financial 
emergency, threatening the flow of reimbursement dollars from Medi-Cal, California’s 
insurance program for low-income families. 
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Blue shield of California Foundation & CHCF
Health Information technology: California Networks for EHR Adoption initiative. The CNEA 
program was initiated in 2006 to speed adoption and lower the overall cost of electronic 
health records in California community clinics and health centers. In 2006, the Blue Shield 
of California Foundation, the California HealthCare Foundation and the Community Clinics 
Initiative, committed approximately $1.5 million to a three-year effort to assist community 
clinics in implementing EHR system The Community Clinics Initiative (CCI) to provide resources, 
evidence-based programming and evaluation, education and training to support community 
health centers and clinics. Through information sharing and major grants, CCI acts as a catalyst 
to strengthen California’s community clinics and health centers to improve health outcomes in 
underserved communities.
California BlueCross Foundation 
Proposal Development: The Proposal Development Award program provides $3,500 and  
is designed to help community nonprofit organizations develop high-quality, effective grant 
proposals for innovative services to improve the health of the community. 
ColoRADo 
Colorado Health Foundation 
Health Information technology: The Healthy Connections initiative of The Colorado 
Health Foundation 
goal: To improve their information technology capabilities and allocated $2.5 million for 
the first year of the initiative. 
grantees: include nine Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHC), four rural health clinics; six 
independent clinics; one family medicine training program; and one nonprofit community-based 
partnership. Phase I: awarded $10,000 each to 15 organizations to assess and develop plans 
for incorporating information technology. Phase II: Six clinics that were further along in the 
planning process received up to $300,000 each for staffing and equipment. Phase II will invest 
up to $6 million in 30 additional planning grants and up to 12 implementation grants. 
mAssACHusEtts 
Blue Cross Blue shield of massachusetts Foundation 
promote Enrollment: $485,000 in grants to 22 community-based organizations, community 
health centers, and select hospital-based programs to help low-income consumers enroll in 
MassHealth, Commonwealth Care, the Health Safety Net, and other public and private health 
access programs and connect with providers. The grants range from $20,000 to $25,000 (http://
www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS193951+06-Jan-2009+BW20090106) 
Appendix 1. Health Center Foundation /Grant Maker Initiatives (continued)
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mInnEsotA 
Blue Cross Blue shield of minnesota 
governance and leadership: REsIlIEnt oRgAnIZAtIons FunD (http://www.resilientnonprofits.
org/announcing-the-convenings/) Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota Foundation, in 
partnership with MAP for Nonprofits, Fieldstone Alliance, and Nonprofits Assistance Fund, will 
be a convening of nonprofit leaders who seek ways of increasing their organization’s health and 
resiliency during an extended economic downturn. Grants of up to $20,000 for up to one year 
are available for planning and implementation activities to address innovation, management, 
financial, governance, and/or structural issues. 
nEw JERsEY 
Horizon Foundation: New Jersey Health Center Initiative was created to expand access to health 
care for thousands of uninsured and underserved individuals throughout New Jersey. This $5 
million, five-year grant Initiative provides needed resources to health centers across New Jersey. 
The Initiative funds charitable 501©(3) Federally Qualified Health Centers and independent health 
centers throughout the state that offer comprehensive primary health care services. 
  Increase access to health care services for uninsured and underserved individuals
  Provide resources to enhance health center operations 
  Expand services to health center patients 
noRtH CARolInA 
BlueCross Blueshield Foundation of north Carolina 
Care for the Uninsured (priority for free clinics): Grants from the Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
of North Carolina Foundation (BCBSNC Foundation) will help North Carolina’s free clinics 
implement disease management programs, provide affordable prescription drugs, target 
services to seniors and immigrants, and take other steps to strengthen and expand services to 
uninsured residents of the state—general grants to the clinics and money linked to specific needs, 
including technology, program expansion, Hispanic services, or treatment of chronic diseases. 
Sixty-two grants totaling $1.5 million are being awarded to North Carolina’s free clinics. 
Appendix 1. Health Center Foundation /Grant Maker Initiatives (continued)
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healTh CeNTer PoliCY iNiTiaTiveS iN oTher STaTeS
policies impacting health centers across the country 
T
hrough the National Association of Community Health Centers and PCDC’s own 
research, we have identified the following activities whose purpose is to strengthen the 
primary care safety net in several states. As with the foundations in Appendix 1, this 
list represents examples of initiatives, and should not be considered comprehensive. 
FunDIng FoR HEAltH CEntERs
transition of uncompensated care pool as health insurance coverage grows (massachusetts): 
Massachusetts, which has nearly universal health coverage, has phased out its uncompensated 
care pool and transferred funds to a new fund—the Health safety net trust Fund. The fund is 
supported through a continuation of payments made by acute hospitals, funds collected from 
the surcharge on uncovered individuals, and federal disproportionate share hospital funds. 
Under the fund, Community Health Centers will be reimbursed at a rate no less than the medicare 
Federally Qualified Health Center (FQHC) rate, with additional payments for services not included 
in the Medicare rate such as Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment (EPSDT) 
services. The measure anticipates the transfer of funds to the C-CHIP program as use of free 
care declines with increased health insurance coverage.
About $6 million from the Fund will be expended annually to fund case management and other 
demonstration projects aimed at reducing fund liability. Such demonstration projects will 
focus on persons with chronic illness, particularly those with substance abuse and psychiatric 
disorders, by enrolling patients in CHCs and community mental health centers coordinating 
with local hospitals. 
An Essential Community provider trust Fund is also established, to support improvements 
in hospitals and CHCs ability to provide “community-based care, clinical support, care 
coordination services, disease management services, primary care services, and pharmacy 
management services.”
providing a guaranteed funding stream for health centers (new Jersey): In 1992 New Jersey passed 
the Health Care Subsidy Act that allocated $10 million to community health centers to expand 
access and help triage patients out of hospital emergency rooms. This funding was a tax on 
hospitals and charged them .53% of 1% revenue. Payments are made monthly to the Department 
of Health and the total amount paid into the fund may not exceed $40 million per year. 
New Jersey also enacted the Health Care stabilization Fund ($44 million) to provide 
emergency grants to hospitals and other licensed health care facilities (including health 
centers) to ensure continuation of access and availability of necessary health care services 
to residents in a community served by a hospital facing closure or significantly reducing 
services due to financial distress. 
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Increasing private payment Rates to Health Centers (Hawaii): In Hawaii, legislation (S.B.1140) was 
introduced that would require all health plans, including government payors and limited benefit 
health insurance policy insurers licensed to do business in the State, to pay FQHCs no less than 
their respective Medicaid PPS rates. Despite passing both houses, the legislation was defeated 
(vetoed, we believe) following intense pressure from the insurance industry. 
Appropriate state funds: 38 states and D.C. allocated $518 million in direct state funding to 
health centers in FY 2009. Direct state funding for health centers often covers the cost of 
providing care for the uninsured or indigent populations, additional services or hours, capital, 
workforce, and health information technology. 
Increase medicaid and CHIp coverage and benefits: Medicaid is the largest insurer of health center 
patients and makes up 37% of health center revenue. Health centers serve 5 million children 
and would benefit from states taking advantage of the enhanced eligibility options in the recent 
CHIP reauthorization. 
woRKFoRCE DEvElopmEnt
new Hampshire—moving funds from gmE to primary Care: In its latest budget, New Hampshire 
eliminated funding for Direct Medical Education for hospitals and redirected the funding 
to a loan repayment program for primary care providers who treat under-served citizens, 
particularly through the Community Health Centers.
support workforce programs: As health centers grow, strategies for addressing clinical 
workforce shortages must include expansion and revitalization of state health care workforce 
programs. Loan repayment and other incentive programs should be supported for primary care 
providers working in medically underserved areas.
Requiring out-stationing of eligibility workers: Federal Medicaid stature requires that states 
outstation eligibility workers at FQHCs and DSH hospitals to allow for the acceptance of 
Medicaid applications from pregnant women, children and youth. However, this mandate has 
been ignored by a large number of states, forcing FQHCs to deploy their own staff. 
EnRollmEnt 
make Enrollment easier: Making the Medicaid and CHIP enrollment process easier has a positive 
financial effect on health centers. This includes presumptive eligibility for Medicaid or CHIP. 
Allowing health center employees to buy into the State Employees Health Benefit Program, which 
could save health centers additional costs associated with purchasing insurance for their staff. 
States can also protect and enhance Medicaid reimbursement for health centers allowing health 
centers to care for more uninsured while drawing down additional federal dollars for the state.
Appendix 2. Health Center Policy Initiatives in Other States (continued)
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Appendix 3. 
meThodoloGY & daTa SourCeS
T
he Primary Care Development Corporation (PCDC) and Health Management 
Associates (HMA) used a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses, 
described below, to examine the experience of New York’s comprehensive Diagnostic 
and Treatment Centers (DTCs) over time in order: (i) to understand how broad and 
deep the financial distress is in the health center sector; (ii) to note factors associated with 
success or failure; and (iii) to use this information to identify policy options for maintaining 
access to health centers in New York. As will also be described below, we convened a group 
with expertise in New York’s DTCs to advise this study. 
ADvIsoRY CommIttEE
In September 2008, PCDC and HMA convened a group with expertise in New York’s DTCs to 
advise this study. The group included health center executives, representatives of the health 
center trade association, financial advisors, and sector advocates. Advisors and their affiliations 
are listed in Attachment 1. In addition to their critical perspectives on NY DTCs, several advisors 
additionally had experience with community health centers nationally or in other states, 
allowing them to identify issues unique to the New York environment. 
To help inform and provide direction for the quantitative and qualitative analyses to be 
undertaken by PCDC and HMA, advisors discussed and debated three questions during a two 
hour focus group in September 2008:
 What are the predictors of success or failure for health centers, particularly in New York?
 Which factor is the most important predictor of success or failure of a center?
  What are the risks and opportunities on the horizon in NY that will affect health center viability?
The group identified a long list of factors that can affect a health center’s financial success. 
Factors divided into two main categories—those related to internal design, operations,  
and leadership and those related to the environment in which centers operate, including  
the payer mix, payment rates, competition, population density, and regulatory atmosphere.  
The full list is presented in Table 1.
The Advisory Committee reached consensus on the two most important determinants of 
financial well-being, but declined to rank one as more important than the other: 
  Speaking to all the internal management issues, Committee members identified the 
business model of the center—both having an actual business model and the model’s relative 
emphasis on revenue generating strategies—as a major predictor of a center’s success. 
  Committee members agreed that reimbursement adequacy—all payers covering costs—
was the most important external issue.
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Committee members also pointed numerous threats to the sector’s short- and long-term 
viability, including:
  The downturn in the economy and the resultant rise in unemployment & likely change in 
payer mix (with resultant strain on health center finances) if the number of uninsured grows 
as anticipated;
  Cuts in foundation grants; 
  Workforce shortages;
  NYSDOH reimbursement inequities and cash lags
  Industry competition—new centers opening in areas served by existing centers that may then 
siphon off paying volume
tABlE 1. Factors Influencing DtC Financial well-Being 
IntERnAl FACtoRs
• Board members’ capacity/capability • Staff quality and quantity
• Management and business systems • Turnover, recruitment and retention issues
• Infrastructure • PMS/EHR implementation
• Fundraising sophistication • Physical plan upkeep
ExtERnAl FACtoRs
• Location
• Urban vs. rural factors
• Socioeconomic and demographic differences, e.g. payer mix
• Competition
• Reimbursement adequacy, e.g., commercial payers paying less than cost
• Grant availability and type/purpose
• Cash flow—impacted by timeliness of payment/payment lags
• Lack of clarity on state policy
• Hospital industry competition—strength in monopolizing “the conversation”
• OMIG auditing agenda & possibility of retroactive cuts 
• Lack of access to capital
• Relationships between providers, e.g., referral relationships
• Proximity to other services—competition or dearth (& how latter effects relationships and ability to help patients access services)
• Hospital/primary care center closures
• Fallout on provision of uncompensated care & access by uncompensated patients 
With little information yet available, Committee members were unable to classify either the new 
Medicaid reimbursement system nor the new quality standards being promulgated by NYSDOH 
as either an opportunity or a threat, but noted they were important factors to watch.
We previewed the findings of the quantitative financial analysis with the Committee in 
March 2009, and then reconvened the Committee in person in June 2009 to review the policy 
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discussion and potential recommendations. Specifically, we asked Committee members to 
consider the following questions as they pertained to the draft policy discussion: 
1. Did we identify the major problems facing New York’s comprehensive health centers?
2. Are the recommendations framed in such a way that they will lead to “fixes”?
3. How would you rank the recommendations in terms of their relative importance
4. How would you rank them in terms of their ability to be addressed?
5.  How should they be addressed—what methodologies should we be suggesting to the NYSHF 
and the NYSDOH, in particular, for actualizing these recommendations?
6.  Finally, are there additional recommendations beyond those outlined in the paper that you 
believe that we should we making, even if they extend beyond the scope of the paper but are 
“natural projections” of the topic?
QuAntItAtIvE FInAnCIAl AnAlYsIs
With guidance from the Advisory Committee, we undertook a quantitative analysis of key 
financial and operating indicators, using data provided by the New York State Department of 
Health (NYSDOH) from the certified Ambulatory Health Care Facility reports (AHCF-1) filed 
by Comprehensive DTCs for calendar years 2001 through 2007. NYSDOH categorizes health 
centers by the services they provide and the population they serve, and in this study we 
focused on the set of centers that NYSDOH categorizes as DTC types 11, 12, or 13 which are 
non-government affiliated centers that provide a comprehensive range of services  
to the general population. 
study sample: To be eligible for inclusion in this study, a center had to be categorized by 
NYSDOH as a Comprehensive DTC. The number of eligible centers increased from 77 in 2001  
to 95 in 2007. While the overall growth in the number of Comprehensive DTCs could be 
interpreted as a sign of strength in the sector, closer analysis indicates that the growth is 
largely a result of: (i) hospital outpatient departments (OPDs) transitioning to DTC status in an 
effort to improve reimbursement, restructure hospital operations or both; and (ii) Special needs 
providers transitioning from “Limited” to “Comprehensive” DTC status to provide a broader 
array of services to their niche populations. While there were “true” new entrants to the DTC 
sector, these contributed only a small percentage to the growth over the six-year study period. 
Not all eligible centers could be included in the study. As shown in Table 2, centers were 
excluded from the study for one of four reasons:
  The center did not submit a cost report to NYSDOH prior to December 15, 2008, the time of 
data collection for this report (or at all in years 2001-2007). As of this date, approximately 75% 
of the Comprehensive DTCs had submitted their 2007 AHCF-1 reports, compared to previous 
years, in which about 85%submitted reports. Centers are required but not specifically 
penalized for not submitting AHCF-1 cost reports, though, beginning with the 2009 cost 
reports, NYSDOH is implementing new procedures and will be enforcing penalties in order to 
improve overall data quality and integrity.
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  The center’s cost report did not provide sufficient data in certain fields that were essential to 
calculate key indicators.
  There were apparent errors in the center’s report that were deemed significant by the authors.
  It was determined by the authors and/or Advisory Committee members that the center differs 
substantially from the other centers in the study in terms of its business model, mission or 
other factors (for example, a center serving a specialized population that was nonetheless 
receiving a rate as a comprehensive center.)
After taking into account these constraints, the number of centers remaining in the study 
ranged from a low of 57 in 2001 to a high of 66 in 2005 and 2006. 
HMA compared the set of centers slated for exclusion to the set slate for inclusion. The 
comparison showed that the two sets were not statistically different in terms of federally 
qualified health centers (FQHC) status or geography and HMA concluded that the exclusions 
were unlikely to result in any bias in the overall analysis. 
tABlE 2. numBER AnD ComposItIon oF DtCs InCluDED In AnAlYsIs
DtC CHARACtERIstICs 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total number of Comprehensive DTCs Eligible for Study 77 80 83 89 90 95 95
Comprehensive DTCs Eligible for Study that did NOT submit a 
Cost Report to the State 8 9 5 8 7 13 23
Number of Eligible DTCs Who Submitted Cost Report 69 71 78 81 83 82 721
Eligible DTCs excluded for data reliability/completeness issues 12 13 15 17 17 16 13
Final Sample of Comprehensive DTCs for Study 57 58 63 64 66 66 59
FInAl sAmplE ComposItIon 
location
Upstate Rural 2 2 3 3 4 4 4
Upstate Urban 21 20 21 21 23 22 20
Downstate 34 36 39 40 39 40 35
FQHC status
FQHC 36 38 41 41 42 43 37
Non-FQHC 20 19 21 21 24 23 21
Switched Status During Year 1 1 1 2 0 0 1
Combined location/FQHC status
Downstate FQHC 22 23 25 26 24 25 21
Downstate Non-FQHC 12 12 13 13 15 15 13
Upstate FQHC 14 15 16 15 18 18 16
Upstate Non-FQHC 8 7 8 8 9 8 8
Center size (measured in annual visits)
Small (<15,000 visits) 6 8 12 10 11 9 9
Medium 45 41 41 42 41 43 37
Large (>100,000 visits) 6 9 10 12 14 14 13
1 This number includes centers who submitted a cost report in time for inclusion in the study (december 15, 2008)
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Financial Analysis Indicators & Data sources: Most indicators used in this analysis are drawn 
from the AHCF-1 cost reports and are derived from those sections of the cost report  
that are certified by each health center’s independent auditor. HMA validated a sample  
of health center cost report data against actual audited financial statements. While some  
minor discrepancies were found (e.g., one health center characterized some assets as  
“other assets” that, arguably, based on a review of the audited financials and footnotes,  
could have been classified as cash), the review provided assurance that overall data quality  
was good. HMA drew some supplemental data from the Uniform Data Set (UDS) reports  
that are submitted by FQHCs to the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)  
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 
HMA analyzed the financial performance of the study centers on key indicators of profitability 
and liquidity, namely: 
profitability Indicators, i.e., Indicators of overall performance 
  Total Margin, defined as overall net income as a percentage of total revenue, provides a 
measure of the overall performance of an organization. This focuses on income from all 
sources, including direct patient care, subsidiary businesses, and investments. The higher 
the margin, the stronger the center’s financial performance. A negative total margin  
indicates that a center had bottom-line losses attributable to one or more of its business 
lines and may be a sign that the center has serious financial difficulties.
  Operating Margin is defined as net operating income as a percentage of net operating revenue, 
and focuses on patient care operations. The higher the margin, the stronger the center’s 
financial performance. A negative operating margin indicates that a center experienced losses 
from patient care operations. 
liquidity Indicators
  Current Ratio is a measure of the degree to which current assets cover current liabilities 
and is a strong indicator of near-tem solvency. Current Ratio is defined as:
[Current Assets] 
[Current Liabilities]
Benchmark—1.0 means that current assets equal current liabilities with no margin, and figures 
above that, such as 1.25 are typically recommended levels for minimum financial health.
  Days Cash-on-Hand measures the number of days of average expenses a center maintains in 
cash or marketable securities. Days Cash-on-Hand is defined as:
[Cash and short-term investments] 
[Total operating expenses minus depreciation]/365 days per year 
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Benchmark—Comfortable fiscal management would require at least thirty days cash on hand to 
pay essential expenses such as payroll. 
  Days in Accounts Receivable, an indicator of timeliness of payments from major payers, 
is one of the factors that most directly affects health center cash flow. Although health 
centers can be captive to delinquent payors, this figure can also rise due to faulty billing and 
collection practices on the part of health centers. Days in Accounts Receivable is defined as:
[Net accounts receivable from patient care delivery, grants, contracts and other sources] 
[Net revenues from those sources plus net assets released from restriction]/365 days per year 
Benchmark—Days in net patient accounts receivable less than 75 days is considered reasonable. 
HMA then analyzed whether and how the factors below, did, as hypothesized, influence the 
financial profile of centers. On Table 2, we have shown the composition of centers by these 
factors, namely:
  Designation as a Federally Qualified Health Center: Because FQHCs receive federal grant 
support and enhanced cost-based Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, their financial 
position is expected to be stronger than that of non-FQHCs. Over half of NY’s Comprehensive 
DTCs are FQHCs or FQHC Look-alikes. FQHC Look-alikes, which are centers that meet 
the same criteria for comprehensiveness but do not receive the federal grants provided to 
FQHCs, are included in this category because their reimbursement is comparable to that of 
the FQHCs in that they receive cost-based Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement (including 
wrap-around payments for Medicare and Medicaid recipients who receive their care through 
a managed care plan). The requirements for and benefits of FQHCs vs. FQHC Look-alikes is 
provided in Appendix 4.
  Center location: Population density, access to providers, and access to referrals are greater 
downstate than upstate, which we hypothesized to be important factors in a health center’s 
success. Of NY’s Comprehensive DTCs, a slightly larger proportion are downstate (i.e., within 
the five boroughs of New York City or the two counties of Long Island.) Among the upstate 
centers, fewer than one-fifth serve rural areas. 
  Center size as measured by patient visit volume: Based on national experience, we expected 
very small centers, those providing fewer than 15,000 visits per year, have more difficulty 
achieving management efficiencies and financial sustainability, compared to very large ones 
providing over 100,000 visits per year. Similarly, medium-volume centers (providing between 
15,000 and 100,000 visits per year) may not see the benefits of the economies of scale seen  
by large health centers. Where possible, we stratified the analysis by these factors to inform 
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the interpretation and policy discussion. 
Though we hypothesized that other factors affect the financial performance of health centers, 
we had to exclude them from the quantitative analysis since reliable date are unavailable.  
We tried to address the role of these non-quantified influences in discussions with the Advisory 
Committee and in interviews with sector experts described below. 
QuAlItAtIvE AnAlYsIs
Key Informant Interviews: Using the guides provided in Attachments 2 and 3, HMA interviewed 
health center executives, sector supporters and NYSDOH staff, to better understand 
reimbursement practices and concerns, regulatory processes and their impact on centers’ 
financial conditions and opportunities for coordination/consolidation, and management/
governance challenges health centers face.
Health Center Executive Interviews: Using the guide provided in Attachment 4, PCDC staff 
interviewed eight health center CEOs to identify the qualitative factors that have contributed to 
(i) their relative success (for stronger centers) or (ii) their improvement (for centers that have 
struggled but shown improvement.)
AttACHmEnt 1. Advisory Committee
nAmE AFFIlIAtIon As oF JunE 2009
Neil Calman, md Institute for Family Health, NYC & Hudson Valley, President/CEO
Sean Cavanaugh United Hospital Fund, Director of Health Care Finance
Georganne Chapin Hudson Health Plan, President/CEO
dan dey Northern Oswego County Health Services, Inc., Executive Director
Peter epp RSM McGladrey, Principal
astrid Gonzalez Lutheran Family Health Network, Brooklyn, CFO
rei Gonzalez Settlement Health and Medical Services, Inc., Manhattan, Executive Director
Paloma hernandez Urban Health Plan, Inc., Bronx, President/CEO
Tom murphy PCDC Board Member; former head of DASNY
Cindy Prorock HRSA Consultant; Interim CFO Hometown Health Center, Schenectady
mark raifman, md Nassau DTC & Triboro Management, Long Island, Managing Member,  CEO & Medical Director; Pediatrician
maurice reid Brownsville Multi-Service Family Health Center, Brooklyn, President/CEO
Julie boden Schmidt National Association of Community health Centers (NACHC), Associate Vice President, Training and Technical Assistance; former health center CEO
Jim Sinkoff Whitney Young Health Center, Albany, President/CEO
elizabeth Swain Community Health Center Association of NYS CEO; former health center CEO
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AttACHmEnt 2. Interview guide for Health Center Executives and Health Center supporters
IntERvIEwEEs
Dan Dey, Executive Director, Northern Oswego County Health Services, Inc.
peter Epp, Principal, RSM McGladrey
paloma Hernandez, CEO, Urban Health Plan
Elizabeth swain, CEO, CHCANYS
Kate Breslin, CHCANYS
Cindy prorock, HRSA Consultant, Interim CFO for Hometown Health Center, Schenectady
Dr. mark Raifman, CEO, Nassau Diagnostic and Treatment Center
QuEstIons RElAtED to ADEQuAtE, tImElY AnD pREDICtABlE pAYmEnts
1 we’re trying to understand the financial challenges health centers are facing in terms of state 
payment timing and adequacy. For each of the following types of payments, could you tell us whether 
payments to your center from the state are regular or unpredictable, on time or usually delayed, 
whether it affects cash flow issues, and to what extent the amounts cover costs? 
	medicaid claims payments
	medicaid wrap—around payments
	managed care transition payments 
	Provider recruitment and retention payments
	State grants and contracts (heal, others?)
2 is the timeliness and adequacy a big or a small problem for you?
3 what are some changes the state could make to make payments more timely or predictable?
4 how different do you think aPGs will be for centers? do you think the aPG system will  result in payments that are more adequate?
5 what type of reimbursement system would you like to see put in place
QuEstIons RElAtED to otHER tARgEtED stAtE suppoRt
1
in what ways could the state better support health centers? (e.g., offsetting more of the cost of 
caring for the uninsured, supporting out-stationed eligibility workers, or support health center 
advancement and expansion)?
2 what areas do you think are most in need of grant support, either from the state or private sources? (e.g., iT, other capital, operating costs, Planning Support for new health centers, other)
QuEstIons RElAtED to REgulAtoRY pRoCEssEs
1
have you experienced, or do you know centers that have experienced, any problems with state 
regulatory processes, for example when adding new sites, requesting rate changes,  
applying for CoN, other? (other than iFh) how do you think the processes could be improved?
2 are you aware of entities that wanted to become new health centers, but could not navigate  the regulatory process? what issues were problematic?
3 For FQhCs, what policy changes do you think are needed at the federal level to better support  health centers?
4 who could provide NY centers support on navigating regulatory processes?
continued on next page 
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AttACHmEnt 2. Interview guide for Health Center Executives and Health Center supporters
CommERCIAl pAYER IssuEs
1 how problematic is it for health centers to negotiate with multiple managed care plans? describe the 
process (i.e., do you negotiate rates or simply take the offered rates)? what kind of support would you 
find helpful in working more effectively with commercial payers and who is best-positioned in NY to 
provide that support? how much staff does it take? other costs? what standardization would help?
2 what could the state do to support primary care providers in this area? would uniform forms and processes help? other ideas? ask about medicaid/FhP/ChP all together; and then commercial.
FInAnCIAl mAnAgEmEnt, stRAtEgIC plAnnIng, AnD govERnAnCE
For ChCaNYS:
1 we have heard that some centers need help with financial management, strategic planning, and 
governance. how widespread are these needs? what type of assistance would be valuable to centers? 
2 ChCaNYS, has anyone tried to assess where centers are on medical home?
For Centers:
3 do health centers need assistance with financial management, strategic planning, or governance? 
does your health center take advantage of the financial, governance and other trainings offered by 
NaChC? if yes, are they useful? if not, why not? (what kind of assistance would help? where do you 
get it? what else do you need? what works?
4 Some state primary care associations provide local/regional training sessions and also help to 
facilitate mentoring (usually upon request from a member health center). does ChCaNYS do this? 
are health centers pleased with the array of offerings from ChCaNYS or could they be doing more to 
support effective health center management?
5 Should ChCaNYS take a more active role in identifying centers that are in distress and providing 
mentoring/assistance? would you need help meeting medical home standards, or the state’s 
primary care standards?
For both:
6 how could foundations play a role in supporting health centers? e.g., direct technical assistance to 
individual health centers, funding for organizing and/or attending training/educational sessions, 
funding up-front costs of merger planning/assessments, other?
—48—
Health Center Financial Check-Up: Prescriptions for Strengthening New York’s Diagnostic and Treatment Centers
Appendix 3. Methodology & Data Sources (continued)
AttACHmEnt 3. Interview guide for nYsDoH staff 
IntERvIEwEEs
oFFICE oF HEAltH InsuRAnCE pRogRAms
gregory Allen, Director, Division of Financial Planning and Policy
terrence Cullen, Assistant Director, Financial Planning and Policy
Alan maughan, Bureau Director, Strategic Planning & Data Analysis
oFFICE oF HEAltH sYstEms mAnAgEmEnt
Karen lipson, Director
lauren tobias, Deputy Director, Division of Policy 
John gahan, Director, Primary and Acute Care Reimbursement
neil Benjamin, Director, Division of Health Facility Planning
Charles Abel, Director, Bureau of Financial Analysis
gEnERAl QuEstIon RE pRElImInARY stuDY FInDIngs
was the state surprised by the findings from our financial analysis re the breadth and depth of financial 
distress among dTCs? does the state see any expanded role for itself in monitoring and  
responding to financial distress when it believes access to care may be jeopardized? Please explain.
QuEstIons RElAtED to mEDICAID, unCompEnsAtED CARE AnD CommERCIAl InsuRAnCE pAYmEnts
1 we understand that New York recently (2/08) made some changes to its wrap-around payment 
methodology; please describe these changes. we’ve heard anecdotally that these payments have 
been delayed in the past. have the changes to the methodology addressed this? if not, has the state 
considered any alternative methodologies? are you hearing complaints re this?
2 The state has traditionally made two “add-on” payments to health centers for provider recruitment and 
retention and for managed care transition, which is being replaced with an ehr transition payment. 
		we understand that both of these payments are matched with federal medicaid dollars; please 
confirm.
		we understand that the methodology for the recruitment and retention (r&r) payments is 
changing/has recently changed from one based on personnel costs to one based on medicaid 
utilization. Can you describe the new methodology and timing? do you anticipate that some health 
centers will have to pay back r&r payments made under the previous methodology, or will there 
be a hold-harmless provision?
		we’ve heard from health centers that r&r payments are frequently delayed. have you heard 
complaints from health centers on this? does the state have any plans to reduce payment delays?
		which centers will get the ehr payments? have centers been notified of this change, and do 
they know if they qualify for payments, and how much they’ll be? Can other centers qualify in the 
future? For how many years will centers get an ehr add-on?
3 The state has traditionally made payments to health centers and other providers (e.g., hospitals)  
to offset the cost of services to the indigent population.
		we understand that the 2010 budget increases the total size of the dTC indigent care pool by $8 
million to a total of $62.5 million; please confirm. we also understand that the state is seeking 
a waiver that would allow federal match on this additional $8 million bringing the total pool 
increase to $16 million. Please confirm and explain.
		is the state contemplating any other near or longer-term changes to either the size of the pool, 
the split between dTCs and other providers, or the distribution formulae?
continued on next page 
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AttACHmEnt 3. Interview guide for nYsDoH staff 
QuEstIons RElAtED to mEDICAID, unCompEnsAtED CARE AnD CommERCIAl InsuRAnCE pAYmEnts 
(ContInuED)
3 The state has traditionally made payments to health centers and other providers (e.g., hospitals)  
to offset the cost of services to the indigent population.
		we have heard anecdotally that these payments have been subject to delays while the state waits 
for late cost report filings. have you heard complaints from health centers about this? does 
the state have any plans for speeding up indigent care pool payments (e.g., by requiring health 
centers to file on time or risk being excluded from the pool)?
4 we understand you’ve been working on an assessment of the impact of aPGs on centers? Can we 
get a copy? if not, can you tell us, on average, what changes centers can expect? what range of 
increases can non-FQhCs expect? how does it compare to cost-based reimbursement? Please 
describe the state’s plans and timing for the aPG roll-out (e.g., base rate, adjustment factors, etc.).
5 we understand that the FQhCs have opted out of aPGs but that a pilot is under development to test 
aPGs with a handful of larger FQhCs. Can you explain the structure and timing of the pilot?
6 is the state contemplating any other reimbursement changes that we should be aware of?
7 From our study and previous studies, we know that many health centers are also struggling with 
issues related to commercial payers, including payments that are well below cost and burdensome 
administrative requirements related to billing and credentialing.
		has the state heard similar complaints? is this an area that the state has actively engaged in and, 
if so, what potential solutions have been on the table?
		has the state considered potential options for standardizing billing forms and credentialing 
processes to ease the burden on providers?
QuEstIons RElAtED to REgulAtoRY pRoCEssEs/mERgERs
1 we have heard that health centers that have any change in status (e.g., moving from non FQhC 
to FQhC, opening a new site, etc.) often face significant delays in getting their rates in place and 
receiving reimbursement (including PPS payments and wrap-around payments) based on the new 
rates. what is the process for a health center that is changing status to establish and begin getting 
paid on its new rate? what are the possible causes for payment delays?
2 does the state have any clear guidelines or schedules for health centers that are undergoing merger/
acquisitions/consolidations? we’ve heard that health centers felt there were no clear instructions, 
guidelines, or single point of contact at the state to guide the centers through all of the regulatory 
requirements involved in these transactions. how should a health center proceed with this process? 
what are the steps and sequence? (e.g., we understand they could involve medicaid rate change 
request, emergency and full CoN process, licensing and inspections of newly acquired facilities, new 
medicaid locator codes and provider numbers, medicaid wrap-around rates for new sites, NYS attorney 
General & Supreme Court approval of asset sale by a nonprofit…) or, how would a health center learn 
the steps and sequences? are they informed about emergency CoNs as a short term bridge while 
undergoing the full CoN process? are there any plans for expediting any of the approvals (e.g., CoN) 
for health centers when there is risk of centers closing and patients losing access to care? are the CoN 
reforms now being studies applicable to the merger/acquisition process, and if so, please describe.
3 Given that mergers/acquisitions/consolidations seems to be one way for failing centers to survive 
and maintain access to care, what are some things the state can do to support these transactions? 
e.g., has the state considered establishing a fund for supporting acquisitions/mergers or helping 
to determine when such transactions would be appropriate/helpful? would these require 
administrative, regulatory, legislative changes?
continued on next page 
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AttACHmEnt 3. Interview guide for nYsDoH staff 
otHER QuEstIons
1 we know that New York has made a number of targeted investments in primary care in recent years, 
including, for example, the heal grants. do you anticipate providing other state support, outside the 
reimbursement formula, to help centers either remain viable or grow stronger to fulfill your vision 
for a greater emphasis on primary care in NY?
		has the state considered the creation of an “incubator” grant program to help entities (especially 
non-FQhC dTCs) become FQhCs?
2 we have heard from health centers that grant and contract payments from the state are frequently 
delayed, causing cash flow problems for the health center. what are the causes of this? what is the 
state doing to remedy this?
3 what is the state’s policy with respect to placing outstationed eligibility workers in FQhCs? what are 
the criteria for placement? who pays the non-federal share (state or health center)?
4 are there things you would suggest a foundation do or support to help address/reduce financial 
distress among health centers?
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AttACHmEnt 4. Interview guide for Financially strong 
or Financially Improved Health Centers
1 For Financially Strong: what factors can you identify as the primary contributors to your financial 
strength?  -or-  For Financially Challenged: Prior to your financial turnaround there were clearly 
factors holding you back from being financially stable. what factors can you identify as the primary 
contributors to previous financial trouble?
2
how much influence did reimbursement play in regards to your financial situation and overall health?
		did rate of payment change?
		how have you handled significant payment lags/delays?
3
For Financially Strong: how do you organize your center’s financial management to deal with 
reimbursement and other financial issues?
		how do you monitor collection rates?
		what is the board’s involvement and what expertise do they bring?
4
For Financially Challenged: how did you improve your center’s financial management to deal with 
reimbursement issues?
		did you hire a CFo?
		did you improve collections?
5 what other management decisions influence your financial health?
		Particular operational efficiencies?
		maintaining / improving provider productivity?
		optimizing use of space?
		any other efficiencies?
		Personnel decisions / changes?
		Fundraising or outreach strategies?
		expanding your network?
		Facility improvements?
		Pooled purchasing?
		340b?
6 does FQhC status have any drawbacks?
7 do you have a hospital or other affiliation that has helped you financially?
8 what is unique about the population you serve that may contribute to your financial situation?
		Special/niche population
		unique geographic location
9 what are you doing now to further strengthen/secure your financial health?
10 what factors would you like to see improve? or what factors continue to hold you back?
11 do you think that upcoming changes in reimbursement will benefit your center’s financial position?
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FQhCS vS. FQhC look-alikeS
T
he table below compares federally qualified health centers (FQHCs) and FQHC Look-
alikes—what defines the two categories and what requirements and benefits accrue 
to each. Note: a single organization may hold both designations encompassing 
different health center sites.
FQHCs vs. FQHC looK-AlIKEs
FQHCs FQHC looK-AlIKEs
DEFInItIon
A federally qualified health center (FQHC) is a type  
of provider defined by the Medicare and Medicaid 
statutes that receives grant funding under Section 
330 of the Public Health Service Act. (PHSA)
Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act  
defines federal grant funding opportunities  
for organizations to provide care to underserved 
populations. Types of organizations that may receive 
330 grants include: Community Health Centers,* 
Health Care for the Homeless Programs,  
and Public Housing Primary Care Programs.
An FQHC Look-alike is  
an organization that  
meets all of  
the eligibility requirements  
of an organization  
that receives  
a PHS Section 330 grant,  
but does NOT receive  
grant funding.
ApplICAtIon pRoCEss
Initial  
Application 
Process
Entities seeking designating as an FQHCs  
(aka, new starts), must participate in a competitive 
application process. Application cycles and  
federal priorities for each cycle are announced  
by HRSA/BPHC. These funding cycles are periodic, 
i.e., as funds become available, and so  
the timing is inconsistent from year to year.  
To qualify, applicants must be operational  
within 90 days of approval.
In support of their application, entities MUST 
supply letters of support from the Primary Care 
Association (CHCANYS in NYS) and from other 
FQHCs where there is service area overlap.
Entities seeking to become an FQHC 
Look-alike, or FQHCs seeking to qualify 
a new health center site as an FQHC 
Look-alike, must file a non-competitive 
application. Applications are accepted 
from operating entities, at any time, 
and are processed as received.
In support of their application,  
entities MUST supply letters of support 
from the Primary Care Association 
(CHCANYS in NYS) and from  
other FQHCs where there is service 
area overlap.
Additional  
Funding 
Application
FQHCs can submit subsequent applications in 
response to announced opportunities for Expanded 
Medical Capacity grants to increase the amount of 
their 330 grant funding for existing sites where the 
organization plans to expand services or for one or 
more new sites the organizations intends to open.
—
*For more information on migrant health, see http://raconline.org/info_guides?public_health/migrant.php.
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FQHCs vs. FQHC looK-AlIKEs
FQHCs FQHC looK-AlIKEs
ComplIAnCE 
REQuIREmEnts
section 330 grantees must comply with all requirements 
stated in section 330 of the pHsA unless they are 
granted a waiver for any governance requirements.
Designated FQHC look-alikes 
must comply with all requirements stated  
in section 330 of the pHsA.
Governing 
Board
Must be governed by a board of directors  
that includes a majority (at least 51%) of active, 
registered clients of the health center  
who are representative of the populations 
served by the center. The governing board 
ensures that the center is community based 
and responsive to the community’s  
health care needs. Under certain conditions  
the board composition requirements  
can be waived for migrant, homeless, and 
public housing only health centers.
Same as  
for FQHCs
Location
Each FQHC that receives PHS 330 grant funding 
must meet the requirements of that specific 
grant. Community Health Centers must serve  
a Medically Underserved Area (MUA)  
or Medically Underserved Population (MUP). 
If an area is eligible for MUA/MUP designation 
though not yet designated, the prospective 
FQHC can apply for such designation in tandem 
with its application for a PHS Section 330 grant. 
Migrant Health Centers, Health Care  
for the Homeless and Public Housing Primary 
Care Programs do not need to meet  
the MUA/MUP restriction. FQHCs may be 
located in rural and urban areas.
Same as for  
Section 330-funded  
Community Health Center  
FQHCs.
Services
FQHCs must provide primary care services  
for all age groups. FQHCs must provide 
preventive health services on site  
or by arrangement with another provider.  
Other requirements that must be provided 
directly by an FQHC or by arrangement  
with another provider include: dental services, 
mental health and substance abuse services, 
transportation services necessary for adequate 
patient care, hospital and specialty care.  
For more information, please see Health Center 
Program Expectations (PIN 98-23).**
Same as for  
FQHCs
Hours of 
Operation
32 hours per week is the minimum.  
FQHCs must also have professional call  
coverage when the practice is closed, directly or 
through an after hours care system.  
For more information, please see Health Center 
Program Expectations (PIN 98-23).
Same as for  
FQHCs
**ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/bphc/docs/1998PiNS/PiN98-23.PdF
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FQHCs vs. FQHC looK-AlIKEs
FQHCs FQHC looK-AlIKEs
ComplIAnCE 
REQuIREmEnts
(ContInuED)
section 330 grantees must comply with all requirements 
stated in section 330 of the pHsA unless they are 
granted a waiver for any governance requirements.
Designated FQHC look-alikes 
must comply with all requirements stated  
in section 330 of the pHsA.
Staffing
There are no specific requirements for staffing 
mix at FQHCs. FQHCs are required to have 
a core staff of full time providers but there 
is no specific definition of core staff. It is 
recommended that they maintain a staffing level 
that allows for between 4,200 and 6,000 visits 
per year for each full-time equivalent health 
care provider. Another guide  
to the appropriate number of providers is 
described in the Requirements of Fiscal Year 
2005 Funding Opportunity for Health Center New 
Access Point Grant Applications (PIN 2005-01) as 
a physician  
to patient ratio of 1:1,500 and a midlevel 
practitioner to patient ratio of 1:750. Additional 
information about staffing and other 
requirements is available in Health Center 
Program Expectations (PIN 98-23). 
Same as for  
FQHCs
Reporting Section 330 grantees annually submit  Uniform Data System (UDS) data.
Designated FQHC Look-alikes  
do not submit Uniform Data System 
(UDS) data; instead they have separate 
annual reporting requirements.
Maintaining 
Status
Section 330 grantees must submit a non-competing 
continuation application annually and  
a competing application every 3 to 5 years 
depending on the length of their project period.
Designated FQHC Look-alikes  
must submit a recertification 
application annually to  
maintain their FQHC status.
FunDIng 
BEnEFIts
section 330 grantees receive enhanced  
FQHC medicaid and medicare reimbursement  
as well as grant funding.
Designated FQHC look-alikes  
receive only enhanced FQHC medicaid  
and medicare reimbursement.
Medicaid 
Fee-for 
Service
Prospective payment system (PPS) based on 
average reasonable cost per visit from 1999 
and 2000.Base year costs were separated into 
operating and capital components and further 
broken down between six cost centers with 
ceilings applied to each cost center within each 
geographic region of the state. The operating 
component is inflated each year by the Medicare 
Economic Index (MEI).
Same as for  
FQHCs
Medicaid 
Managed 
Care
Managed care plans reimburse FQHCs at 
negotiated fee-for-service or capitated rates. 
FQHCs receive “wrap-around” payments from 
the state that make up the difference between 
the managed care payment and the fee-for-
service PPS rate.
Same as for  
FQHCs
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FQHCs vs. FQHC looK-AlIKEs
FQHCs FQHC looK-AlIKEs
FunDIng 
BEnEFIts 
(ContInuED)
section 330 grantees receive enhanced  
FQHC medicaid and medicare reimbursement  
as well as grant funding.
Designated FQHC look-alikes  
receive only enhanced FQHC medicaid  
and medicare reimbursement.
Medicare
Cost reimbursement methodology up to a federal 
cap, which is currently $117.41 for urban  
FQHCs and $100.96 for rural FQHCs. Certain 
services (e.g., most labs) are excluded from  
the encounter rate and may be billed separately 
through the Medicare Part B intermediary. 
FQHC services are exempted from the Medicare 
deductible. FQHCs receive “wrap-around” 
payments from Medicare that make up  
the difference between Medicare managed care 
payments and the Medicare fee-for-service rate. 
The Medicare rate is inflated each year by  
the Medicare Economic Index (MEI). 
Same as for  
FQHCs
Self-Pay
FQHCs receive 330 funding to help cover the cost  
of caring for the uninsured. For new starts,  
funding up to $650,000 per year can be requested.
FQHCs are required to see all patients regardless  
of ability to pay and to place uninsured patients  
on a sliding fee scale that ranges from a nominal  
or no charge (for patients below 100% FPL)  
to full charges (for patients above 200% FPL). 
FQHCs are eligible for payments from the state 
indigent care pool based on its charity care losses 
as a proportion of the total statewide charity care 
loss for voluntary comprehensive DTCs.
Designated FQHC Look-alikes  
do NOT receive  
Section 330 grant funds.
otHER BEnEFIts
Federal 
Tort Claims 
Act (FTCA) 
Coverage
Section 330 grantees are  
eligible to apply for malpractice coverage  
under the FTCA.
Designated FQHC Look-alikes  
CANNOT apply for  
malpractice coverage under the FTCA. 
340B Drug 
Pricing 
Program 
Participation
FQHCs are eligible to purchase  
prescription and non-prescription medications  
for outpatients at reduced cost through  
the 340B Drug Pricing Program†
Same as for  
FQHCs
HPSA 
Designation  
& Access  
to National 
Health  
Service Corps
FQHCs receive automatic designation as  
a Health Professional Shortage Area (HPSA).  
The HPSA designation provides eligibility  
to apply to receive National Health Service Corps 
(NHSC) personnel and eligibility to be a site  
where a J-1 visa physician can serve. 
Designated FQHC Look-alikes  
receive automatic  
HPSA designation.
Other FQHCs have access to the Vaccine for Children program,‡ and other federal grants/programs. Similar to FQHCs
Sources: hrSa website, e.g.,: (a) health Center Program requirements at http://bphc.hrsa.gov/about/requirements.htm and health 
center benefits @ http://bphc.hrsa.gov/about/benefits.htm; (b) Program assistance letter (Pal) 06-01: dual Status health Centers 
(that are both FQhC look-alikes and Section 330 grantees); (c) unprecedented Growth: health Center expansion 2002-2007 at  
http://bphc.hrsa.gov/success/unprecedentedgrowth.htm
†http://www.hrsa.gov/opa/introduction.htm
‡http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/vfc/default.htm
voiCe: 212-664-7656
Fax: 646-421-6029 
mail: 1385 broadway, 
23rd Floor 
New York, NY 10018
web: www.nyshealth.org
improving the State of 
New York’s health
